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OVERVIEW OF THE AIR WAR IN THE GULF AND INTRODUCTION 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 precipitated the 
first international crisis of the post-Cold War era, which 
led in its turn to the first major conflict of this period, 
the 1991 Gulf War. Between August 1990 and January 1991 the 
Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, defied the insistence of the 
international community, led by the united states, that the 
occupation of Kuwait would "not stand", in the words of the 
united states President, George Bush. 
A multinational Coalition, acting under united Nations (UN) 
authority and directed by the united states Central Command 
(CENTCOM), commenced air strikes against Iraq on January 17 
1991. The Coalition's very intensive air campaign, 
designated as Operation Desert storm, continued until 
February 23 1991. This campaign was immediately followed by 
a ground assault (Operation Desert Sword) on February 24 
which evicted the Iraqi Army from Kuwait and had placed 
Coalition forces deep inside Iraq when a cease-fire took 
effect on February 28. 
Coalition aircraft flew a total of 109,876 sorties in the 
war, of which approximately 50 per cent were combat or 
strike missions. [lJ Parallel operations were conducted 
against both Iraqi front-line forces and more deeply located 
strategic targets. [2J A particularly important strategic 
strike role was assigned to united states Air Force (USAF) 
F-117A stealth fighter bombers. CENTCOM's presentation of 
video-tapes of precision-guided missile (PGM) strikes helped 
create the impression of "an uneven match between a high-
tech power .. and a backward Third World army". [3J 
It is difficult to cite a comparable imbalance between the 
respective lengths of discrete air and ground campaigns as 
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in the Gulf War. CENTCOM had based its planning on worst-
case estimates of Iraqi capabilities. While these estimates 
were significantly lowered by January 17, CENTCOM still 
expected that its ground offensive would require 2 to 3 
weeks, rather than its actual 4 days, to eject Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait. 
The surprising rapidity of the Iraqi Army's collapse 
provided proof to many that the air campaign achieved a 
strategic yield at least commensurate with the effort 
expended on it. Further support was provided, even before 
Desert Sword commenced, by the increasing eagerness of very 
large numbers of Iraqi soldiers to desert or surrender. 
Prisoner of war interrogations indicated that the sustained 
bombing of Iraqi front-line forces had severely eroded their 
morale. 
The 1990s had commenced with expectations that the end of 
the Cold War would foster a general easing of international 
tensions - Iraq in particular was expected by US 
intelligence agencies to remain quiescent in order to 
recover from the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. [4J The Gulf War 
demonstrated that conflicts stemming from regional disputes 
could emerge as rapidly, with the removal of superpower 
tensions, as in the past. 
Once hostilities were joined, the Gulf War also showed that 
the destructive capabilities of modern weapons could produce 
a quick resolution of regional conflicts. However, the 
political constraints governing the Coalition's operations 
meant that this resolution was unlikely to be comprehensive, 
despite its overwhelming advantages in military force. 
In evicting Iraq from Kuwait, the Coalition forces achieved 
all that the UN had authorised them to do and thus achieved 
the principal declared political objective of the united 
3 
states and its partners. However, this specific achievement 
fell short of an indirect but nevertheless explicit goal set 
out by President Bush before the ground offensive commenced 
- that "the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people .. [should] 
force Saddam Hussein .. to step aside". [5J 
While the Coalition possessed the military means to 
facilitate this outcome, such intervention was not a 
political possibility. The UN's authorisation for the use 
of force against Iraq was not interpreted by the Coalition 
as permission for a prolonged occupation of the country, 
perhaps the only certain way of destroying Saddam's regime. 
Most importantly, the sensitivities of America's Arab allies 
to the occupation of an Arab state by non-Muslims precluded 
serious consideration of this option. 
Saddam's survival, despite the twin Shi'ite and Kurdish 
revolts against his regime in March 1991, and his continued 
irritation of the united states, therefore shows the 
political limits on what major powers can accomplish with 
military force. These limits were indeed advertised by 
President Bush's statement in April 1991 that the united 
states "never implied" that it would provide military 
support to the Iraqi people, if they chose to "take matters 
into their own hands". [6J 
**** 
The discussion of Coalition air operations has grappled with 
two general issues - the historical question of their 
contribution to Iraq's defeat, and the more speculative set 
of questions relating to their implications for the future 
of armed conflict. Sibbald has observed that the initial 
support which the events of the Gulf War appeared to provide 
to the view "that airpower alone could win the conflict", 
now appears "significantly less clear". [7J Such historical 
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uncertainties are inevitably amplified in any attempt to 
distil the implications of the air war in the Gulf for 
future conflicts. 
This thesis focuses on, firstly, the strategic effectiveness 
of the Coalition's air operations and secondly, the 
technological, doctrinal and command aspects of these 
operations and their contribution to this overall 
effectiveness. 
Chapter 1 considers the issues raised to date by analysis of 
the Coalition air campaign, including the contrast between 
the contentions of the USAF and others, that the air 
campaign was a comprehensive success with far-reaching 
consequences for future military developments, with other 
assessments that diverge from these views. 
The degree to which such analysis has probed the general 
issues of the air campaign's overall contribution to the 
Coalition victory, and the value of particular aspects of 
the air campaign to it, is explored in this chapter. 
Chapter 2 details the events leading up to the Gulf War and 
the balance of forces between Iraq and the Coalition in mid-
January 1991. While the causes of the war are not part of 
the central focus of this thesis, some discussion of them is 
necessary to explain why the united States in particular 
made an enormous, and expensive, military effort against 
Iraq. 
This chapter also considers the historical and doctrinal 
influences on Coalition and Iraqi strategies. The Coalition 
and Iraqi command structures, and some of the operational 
issues that emerged in relation to them, are also discussed. 
IIi' 
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Chapter 3 details the sequence of air operations in the Gulf 
War. This chapter also develops on the focus of Chapter 1 
and examines some of the contrasting views concerning 
particular aspects of the air campaign in further detail. 
Chapter 4 presents the conclusions of the thesis. 
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[3J Freedman & E. Karsh, op cit, p. 437 . 
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CHAPTER 1 - EXISTING ANALYSIS OF THE AIR WAR IN THE GULF 
A consideration of the conclusions drawn by institutional 
(individual armed service) and other commentary on the Gulf 
War is important to an analysis of the air campaign on at 
least two levels. Firstly, these conclusions represent the 
product of what is already a reasonably comprehensive base 
for analysis, given that the Gulf War is still recent, and 
given also the critical omission from most military analyses 
of a first-hand Iraqi perspective. 
Secondly, whether by action or reaction, these views reflect 
to a considerable extent the dynamics of the institutional 
debate over the relative effectiveness of air, ground and 
naval forces (including naval aviation) in the war. Insofar 
as this debate influences future military developments, it 
is itself an important consequence of the Gulf War. 
The significance of the Coalition air campaign is emphasised 
by the fundamental reasons why it has attracted such 
interest and debate. Foremost among these was the dominance 
of the united States, the one power that could reasonably 
claim to retain comprehensive superpower status in the early 
1990s, in the Coalition's military operations. 
The defeat of Iraq provided a fillip, however temporary, to 
American self-confidence following a period when analyses of 
the relative decline in American economic performance called 
into question the ability of the united States to maintain 
its international pre-eminence. The Gulf War was both the 
first major conflict that was not fought within an 
overarching context of Soviet-us rivalry, and what appeared 
to be the first clear-cut victory for united states armed 
forces over a significant opponent, since 1945. 
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The emergence of assessments that the performance of the 
Iraqi armed forces fell far short of the capabilities 
claimed for them by both sides, Saddam's survival against 
what appeared to be all the odds at the end of the war, and 
most recently the renewed US air and cruise missile strikes 
on Iraq in January and June 1993, have forced continuing 
revision of the conclusion that the Gulf War was brief and 
decisive. [lJ 
Moreover, many people, including some united states 
officials and individual USAF personnel, cautioned against 
drawing exaggerated lessons from the air campaign; it was 
also observed that its very success could stimulate 
reactions that might reduce the advantages of united states 
air power in a future conflict . 
In March 1991, however, the apparent quick and decisive 
success of the air campaign underlay the claim that the 
united states' future military investments should emphasise 
its comparative advantage in air power. 
This claim was vigorously expounded by the USAF even before 
the Gulf War began. Its Chief of Staff, General Michael 
Dugan, was dismissed in September 1990 after he claimed, 
inter alia, that a properly targeted strategic air campaign, 
that made Saddam Hussein "the focus of our efforts", would 
eliminate the need for ground operations other than in the 
secondary roles of "diversions, flanking attacks, and to 
block an Iraqi counter-strike". [2J Dugan's successor, 
General Merrill A. McPeak, stated in March 1991 that the 
Gulf War was "the first time in history that a field army 
has been defeated by air power". [3J 
Two factors help explain the importance of the opportunity 
the Gulf War provided to the USAF (and other air forces) to 
vigorously proselytize the notion that air power had 
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achieved strategic primacy. The first concerns the 
doctrinal debate among Western military services over the 
strategic efficacy of air power that has continued for most 
of this century. The second was the prospect that the end 
of the Cold War would produce a much more restrained and 
competitive environment for budget allocations to individual 
armed services. [4] 
Air power had achieved significant tactical and strategic 
successes before the Gulf War and, as CENTCOM recognised, 
the Middle East has historically been a favourable arena for 
the use of air power. However, these successes were 
overshadowed by the frustrations of air offensives in the 
Second World War and in the Korean and vietnam wars. These 
frustrations generated a pervasive scepticism concerning the 
strategic value of air campaigns, especially strategic air 
campaigns conducted independently of ground operations. 
The "enormous pool of data" which the Gulf War furnished has 
not resolved the much contested issue of the strategic 
potential of air power. [5] Thus, "Institutional arguments 
continue over whether the Coalition air forces fought a 
separate air campaign, or only air operations in a wider 
context and over whether Coalition strategy followed the 
[United States military] doctrine of AirLand Battle [which 
emphasised the integration of air and ground operations] or 
represented a refined form of independent strategic bombing, 
plus a largely unnecessary ground war". [6] 
Most analysts acknowledge that the Coalition quickly 
translated its initial advantage in air power into a 
dominance over all aspects of air operations. This in turn 
greatly enhanced the Coalition's ability to control the 
subsequent sequence of operations - in particular to resist 
any temptation to launch a premature ground offensive, which 
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probably would have provided Iraq's only opportunity to 
inflict significant damage on the Coalition. 
A base-line conclusion, held even by more sceptical 
analysts, is that it is "beyond doubt" that the "chronic 
[Iraqi] inferiority in airpower [demonstrated] a strategic 
liability for which it is almost impossible to compensate in 
regular conventional warfare". [7] 
However, from this common point there is a wide divergence 
in consequent conclusions. Moreover, while individual 
services may have projected a consensus institutional view 
of the broader implications of the war, these views were not 
necessarily universal within them. 
For instance, a USAF colonel, who served in the Gulf War, 
was quoted in a US Army publication as stating that "air 
power can only do so much, the Army must go in on the ground 
to .. finally win the battle". [8] There has also been intense 
internal debate within the USAF over specific implications 
of the Gulf War including the "right mix" of stealth and 
non-stealth aircraft, and PGMs and unguided munitions, in 
future procurement policies. [9] 
Equally, while many individual authors support some 
institutional conclusions, they have also made some 
significant departures from them. R.A. Mason wrote that the 
Gulf War "marked the apotheosis of twentieth century air 
power" and was thus likely to have significant implications 
for future conflicts. However, he cautioned that "no matter 
what lessons are extracted from the Gulf War, no-one knows 
who the next examiner will be". [10] 
Gary Waters states that the Gulf War "may represent a 
telling indicator for the future" because the "pursuit of 
Iraqis fleeing from constant air attack and the acceptance 
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of final surrender could hardly be termed a ground war" [IIJ 
He also claims that, had the air campaign continued for 
another 10 days, the Iraqi Army "probably would have 
surrendered". [12J These conclusions are consistent with 
USAF views. 
However, Waters also questioned the value of providing air 
support during the ground offensive when "Allied forces held 
obvious superiority on the ground". [13J This supports the 
concept of 'jointness' - the conduct of military operations 
so as to emphasise the strengths of individual services -
rather than a theory of the strategic primacy of air power. 
It would therefore be misleading to describe particular 
analyses of the air campaign as representing rigidly defined 
schools of thought; it is most useful to classify 
interpretations of the air war into groups of authors who 
have reached some broadly similar, but by no means uniform, 
conclusions. 
The one significant general exception to this absence of 
uniformity are the more holistic claims of the individual 
services which, as noted, are at least partly influenced by 
a fiscally constrained environment. 
Four groups of analyses can be identified by their 
conclusions relating to the overall decisiveness of the air 
campaign and by their comments on more specific aspects of 
it. 
These groups include, firstly, those authors who subscribe 
to the USAF view that the air campaign was comprehensively 
successful and far-reaching. Richard P. Hallion's statement 
that "air power has clearly proven its ability not merely to 
be decisive in war - but to be the determinant of victory in 
war" is representative of the ambitious conclusion of this 
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group that Coalition air operations demonstrated a 
revolution in the conduct of war. [14J 
The conclusions of a second group of authors, including 
Mason and Waters, are very similar. These authors 
acknowledge the decisiveness of the air campaign within the 
unique context of the Gulf War, and conclude it showed that 
air power is likely to significantly influence most future 
conflicts. However, they are more cautious concerning the 
effectiveness of air power in specific future contingencies. 
These authors emphasise how the Coalition was uniquely 
advantaged by factors such as the isolation of Iraq from 
international support, and by the desert conditions of most 
of the Kuwaiti Theatre of Operations (KTO) - Kuwait and 
south-eastern Iraq, which provided a favourable arena for 
air operations. They emphasise that such advantages would 
not exist if international support for military action was 
weaker than in the Gulf War, or if air power was used in 
less favourable terrain, or indeed if a future opponent 
conducted vigorous defensive counter-air operations. 
Some US officials shared this caution. Frank Kendall, . ln 
1991 the US under-secretary of defense for tactical warfare 
programs, stated that the implications of the Gulf War were 
limited because the Coalition did not defeat a well-prepared 
force in "a dynamic environment". [15J 
An interesting variation on the theme of the decisiveness of 
air power was developed by Mohamed Heikal. He stated that 
"the idea that a third world country could absorb and 
withstand an intensive aerial bombardment by a superpower" 
[disintegrated] "in the first minutes of Operation Desert 
Storm", and that Coalition ground forces finished "a 
task .. almost entirely achieved by Coalition air power". [16J 
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In strategic terms, Heikal's conclusion could have been 
written by Generals Dugan or McPeak. However, it represents 
the outcome of a very different approach to theirs; it is 
conditioned by the view that Western powers have exploited 
Arab political divisions throughout this century, and that 
the use of modern air power is the latest means of 
continuing this exploitation. 
A third group has emerged, to a significant extent in 
reaction to USAF claims, which has sharply questioned the 
value of attacks on Iraqi economic and other strategic 
targets, while affirming the decisive value of air strikes 
against front-line Iraqi Army units. 
This view supports the US Navy (USN) and US Army views that 
the primary focus of air operations should be on an 
opponent's forces in the field. William Arkin, the only 
analyst of the air campaign who has so far been permitted to 
conduct investigations in Iraq, concluded that the strategic 
phases of the air campaign were "effective, efficient, legal 
and largely unnecessary" because the decisive blows of the 
war were accomplished through the tactical bombing of Iraqi 
forces. [17J 
Arkin's views have been supported by Freedman and Karsh, who 
conclude that "the aspects of [the USAF's] campaign most 
directed against Iraq's economic and political structure 
[were] least relevant to the ultimate victory". [18J 
The Coalition's air campaign was governed by a wider 
strategy which sought to successfully conclude the war as 
soon as possible. In this context Freedman and Karsh have 
supported Arkin's assessment that the broader strategic 
justification for the scale of the air attacks on some Iraqi 
strategic targets, such as electrical power production and 
oil production facilities, was weak. They acknowledge these 
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attacks efficiently destroyed many of these facilities, but 
consider that this was unlikely to have a meaningful 
strategic effect in a short war. [19J 
In reply to Arkin's critique, USAF personnel involved in the 
target selection process acknowledged the importance of B-52 
strikes, in particular, in breaking the Iraqi Army's will, 
but they rejected the notion that attacks on Iraqi oil, 
electricity and transportation did not affect the outcome of 
the war. [20J 
Arkin's view are themselves not completely consistent. 
Given his view that strategic strikes were largely 
"irrelevant", his comments on another strategic target set 
are interesting. He faults strikes on Iraqi command, 
control and communications (C3 ) facilities because, firstly, 
many were allegedly targeted against facilities from which 
vital electronic equipment had been removed, in anticipation 
of attacks. [21J Arkin's criticism of these attacks is 
therefore concerned more with their effectiveness than the 
relevance of the targets themselves. (See also p.70) 
Secondly, Arkin claims that poor co-ordination between the 
US State Department and USAF target planners prevented the 
State Department's opinion, that it would not be an illegal 
act if Saddam Hussein was killed as a by-product of attacks 
on Iraqi command facilities, from being communicated to 
target planners until late in the war. (USAF planners were 
constrained by an Executive Order in force since 1976 which 
prohibits assassination attempts on foreign leaders by US 
agencies). Arkin considers that, while a strike on Saddam 
had "some hope of success" early in the war, by the time 
such strikes were mounted he could not be traced. [22J 
It is therefore ironic, given Arkin's focus on the 
'irrelevance' of strategic strikes, that on this issue his 
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analysis converges with General Dugan's view that a 
strategic air campaign with a personal focus on Saddam 
provided the best prospect of early victory. 
A fourth group acknowledges the importance of the air 
campaign but considers that the decisive operation of the 
war was the ground assault on Iraqi forces. Pimlott and 
Badsey have concluded that the USAF claim "that airpower 
alone defeated the Iraqi Army .. has not withstood even brief 
examination". [23] 
Some of the contrasting views of these four groups can be 
illustrated by their conclusions regarding two issues: the 
relative strategic effectiveness of land-based and carrier-
based aviation and the contribution of advanced technology 
to Coalition air operations. 
The focus of institutional arguments on the first issue is a 
very interesting development. A traditional claim advanced 
by proponents of air power argued that a properly 
constituted strategic air campaign would eliminate the need 
for a major effort by ground forces. [24] As noted, this 
argument was reiterated before and since the Gulf War. Such 
claims are not surprising; what is more significant is that 
they have not constituted the 'main game' for institutional 
players in the debate over the implications of the air war. 
General McPeak's claim that air power won the Gulf War might 
have been expected to set in train a fierce institutional 
argument between the US Army and the USAF. Instead, based 
on their Gulf War experiences, these two services were able 
to quietly come to an agreement in September 1991 which more 
carefully defined the role of each in a future battlefield 
(and which changed the name of the AirLand Battle Doctrine 
to AirLand Operations). [25] 
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By contrast, the debate between the USAF and the USN over 
the effectiveness of aircraft carrier strikes has been very 
intense. This debate appears mutually reinforced by the 
direct competition between the two services for budget 
appropriations for military aviation, their very deep 
doctrinal differences concerning the use of air power, and 
operational difficulties which emerged during the war itself 
(see p.39). 
Jeffrey Record wrote that the Gulf War has advertised "the 
limits of sea-based air power" - including "its exorbitant 
cost .. comparatively short range and lack of cumulative and 
sustained punch". [26J Hallion claims that aircraft carriers 
do not project long-range power "very well" and that a 
reassessment of their role "in long-range strikes against 
deeply located land targets" .. "is long overdue". [27J 
Against this, probably the most crucial argument in support 
of the effectiveness of carrier strikes is based on the 
important statistic that USN aircraft "carried out at least 
60 per cent of the operations to suppress Iraqi air 
defences". [28J Given the quick success and importance of 
these operations (see p.66), criticisms of the strategic 
effectiveness of naval aviation in the Gulf War appear much 
harder to justify. 
This does not in itself counter the argument that the same 
"punch" could have been delivered for less cost had some of 
the money spent on carrier battle groups been available for 
additional investments in land-based air power. However, 
Pimlott and Badsey conclude that, with the end of the Cold 
War, "united States and European NATO thinking has turned 
increasingly to power projection and improvised overseas 
deployments". [29J 
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Such deployments could necessarily mean forgoing a 
comparable advantage to the well-developed infrastructure 
which greatly assisted USAF operations from Saudi Arabia in 
the Gulf War, and could thus increase the importance of 
carriers. These deployments could "give naval forces an 
enhanced importance and role" and "the quiet success of the 
US Navy and its Coalition partners" - in public relations 
terms, the USN performed poorly compared with the USAF and 
the US Army in the Gulf War - "could well be one of lasting 
importance". [30J 
The question of the value of high technology to the success 
of the Coalition air campaign is not straightforward, and 
some of the problems of definition it raises can be 
illustrated by three issues. 
Firstly, the definition of a high technological air asset 
poses difficulties in that this concept is variable in 
respect of particular air assets. In the case of older 
aircraft such as the B-52, for instance, the measure of its 
high technological capabilities is a function not only of 
their age but also their adaptiveness to system upgrades 
which extend service life and effectiveness. 
One US official said that the Gulf War demonstrated the 
premium importance of PGMs and showed that unguided, "dumb" 
bombs were "just that". [31J However, the B-52s which 
delivered most of these dumb bombs incorporated such high 
technological features as advanced satellite-linked 
navigation systems and avionics that permitted more accurate 
bomb delivery. [32J It is therefore difficult to regard 
their missions as a low-technology proposition or, given 
their generally acknowledged effectiveness against Iraqi 
front-line forces, as strategically misconceived. 
18 
Secondly, advanced technology is an integral component of 
most modern 
generally. 
the united 
air forces, and modern military forces 
Despite their clear technological advantages, 
States and its partners did not encounter a 
technologically backward opponent in Iraq. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, there were important qualitative 
differences in the ability of Coalition and Iraqi forces to 
effectively absorb the full potential of the military 
technology available to them. 
Thirdly, the use of some technologies in the Gulf War was so 
limited that it is difficult to draw sUbstantive conclusions 
as to their strategic effectiveness. Gary Waters has 
suggested that the 12 Tomahawk Land Attack (cruise) Missiles 
(TLAMs) launched from USN submarines were used "more to 
demonstrate the capability than anything else". [33J 
Conceivably, a similar inference could be drawn from the one 
occasion when air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) were used 
(see p.64). 
The Gulf War marked the first significant combat test for an 
array of aircraft and combat systems. As well as cruise 
missiles, these included stealthy aircraft and a variety of 
munitions and missiles. The natural interest in the 
apparent novelty of this technology - much of it, including 
the F-117s, was actually mature technology - contributed to 
the apparent, and in some ways exaggerated, prominence of 
high technology in the air campaign. 
CENTCOM had planned an extended air campaign to exploit its 
advantages in air power over the Iraqi Army, which "while 
not quiet the fourth largest army in the world as the 
Pentagon described it", was nevertheless a sUbstantial 
force. [34J 1,010 Coalition personnel were killed and 
wounded compared with estimates of between 10,000 and 
100,000 Iraqis killed in the war. [35J The results of the 
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air campaign, particularly this disproportionate ratio, 
appeared to place modern, high-technology air power squarely 
within a central tradition of American military doctrine of 
maximising the use of technology and firepower to minimise 
American casualties. [36] 
Following from this, the most ambitious claims for the value 
of high technological air assets are intermeshed with the 
most ambitious claims for the air campaign itself - that it 
showed that modern technology had 'caught up' with 
predictions dating back to the First World War that air 
power could "decide wars on its own". [37] 
There has, however, been extensive questioning of some 
official performance indicators of Coalition air operations, 
including revisions of the 'kill rates' of individual 
weapons. For instance, The Washington Post claimed in April 
1992 that the 90 per cent success rate claimed for laser 
guided bombs (LGBs) delivered by F-117As was actually closer 
to 60 per cent. [38] 
other assessments have questioned initial claims concerning 
the performance of particular aircraft, such as the ability 
of F-117As to evade Iraqi radar early in the war without the 
support of electronic warfare aircraft. 
Such revisions have emerged in parallel to the arguments of 
Arkin and others that no matter how well particular assets 
performed in the Gulf War, the rationale for acquiring 
succeeding generations of them is weakened if they were used 
in operations which had a negligible strategic effect. 
Arkin has challenged the USAF claim that the Gulf War 
demonstrated the need for increasingly expensive investments 
in technologically advanced aircraft which can "do a triple 
somersault but can't carry the massive amount of bombs you 
need to win a war". [39] 
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Existing analysis of the Gulf War has furnished a wealth of 
material on the preceding issues. However, the most 
critical gap in our understanding of this conflict is the 
absence of an Iraqi perspective which, among other matters, 
can illuminate the decision-making processes of the Iraqi 
command structure. 
The general nature of Iraq's highly centralised and, under 
Saddam, highly personalised command structure is understood. 
However, there have clearly been no 'insider' Iraqi accounts 
to complement those describing the deliberations of united 
states' command authorities - although Heikal presents 
undocumented claims concerning details of some key Iraqi 
decisions. 
This gap has helped to focus most discussion of the military 
aspects of the Gulf War on issues related to the experience 
and strategic interests of Coalition participants. While 
this focus is legitimate - the Coalition was undeniably more 
active than Iraq - there are valuable defensive lessons in 
some Iraqi operations (see Chapter 3). 
The scarcity of Iraqi sources does not mean that analysis of 
Iraqi actions is impossible, but it is likely to be 
incomplete. For instance, there are identifiable factors, 
including the superiority of force held by the Coalition, 
and the relatively poor morale and combat training of Iraqi 
air crews, which provide credible explanations for the Iraqi 
Air Force's poor performance in the war. However, these 
alone do not completely explain either this general failure 
or specific Iraqi actions. 
For instance, a variety of theories have been advanced to 
explain why, early in the war, many of Iraq's more capable 
aircraft were flown to Iraq's recent enemy, Iran. (To 
"r,ltr--~-----=============------------------------
" 
Ill. 
III 
II, 
I~ 
II 
I :~ 
~ 
~I 
If' 
)d 
...L1li 
I' 
21 
Freedman and Karsh this was an "act of panic" by Saddam; 
according to Heikal it was a reasoned decision based on a 
calculation of the risks involved in 'flight or fight'). 
[40J 
While many of the explanations for this and other Iraqi 
decisions are highly plausible, they will remain speculative 
until an authoritative explanation from the Iraqi side is 
made. 
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CHAPTER 2 - BALANCE OF FORCES 
Iraq ended its war with Iran notionally victorious, but with 
a severely disrupted economy. Iraq began the war with a $35 
billion surplus in its balance of payments; it ended it with 
an $80 billion deficit. [1] Iraqi economic weakness was 
dangerously coupled to a military establishment which by 
1989 was "the most formidable" in the Arab world. [2] This 
combination maximised both the temptation for, and the 
pressure on, Saddam to resolve his domestic difficulties by 
military means. 
Saddam's declared differences with Kuwait in 1990 centred on 
the price of oil. Even some unsympathetic observers 
acknowledge there was "some justification" in Saddam's claim 
that Kuwait and the united Arab Emirates (UAE) , by exceeding 
their oil production quotas set by the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting countries (OPEC), had depressed oil 
prices. [3] 
The increase in international consumption this fall produced 
disproportionately benefited more developed petroleum 
exporters such as Kuwait which had greater investment in oil 
refinement and distribution. The price fall impacted 
adversely on Iraq with its much greater dependence on crude 
oil export. 
Despite these differences, and the parallel deterioration in 
Iraqi-US relations, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was largely 
unexpected. US Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, 
CENTCOM's Commander-in-Chief, predicted that any Iraqi 
incursion into Kuwait would be limited. [4] The Kuwaiti 
armed forces were placed on alert in mid-July but were 
stood-down immediately before the invasion to avoid 
provoking Saddam. 
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It appeared unthinkable to most Arab leaders before August 
1990 that an Arab nation would invade a 'brother' Arab 
state; their consequent shock underlay their support for the 
united states' actions against Iraq. However, President 
Bush's achievement in assembling the Coalition against Iraq 
was a profound reversal of recent us policy. 
united states' support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War was 
pre-conditioned by the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, in 
which the Shah of Iran, one of America's most staunch 
allies, was deposed by the vehemently anti-American regime 
of the Ayatollah Khomeini. A related but even more 
important influence on American attitudes was the seizure of 
us embassy staff in Tehran in November 1979 by pro-Khomeini 
students, and their subsequent detention until January 1981. 
Throughout the 1980s Iran was "an obsession for decision-
makers in Washington. Hence if Iraq could keep Iran in 
check that .. was a cause for commendation". [5J In 1984 the 
Reagan Administration removed Iraq from its list of 
'terrorist states' and added Iran. By 1990 the united 
states had extended agricultural credits worth $1 billion to 
Iraq. US military satellite data was made available to Iraq 
and the united states also acquiesced in the supply of us 
arms to Iraq from legitimate clients. [6J 
The major departure from this policy was the Iran-Contra 
affair of 1985, when officials in the Reagan Administration 
conspired to supply Iran arms, via Israel, for funds 
ultimately used to support the US-backed Contra rebels in 
Nicaragua. However, the desire to control the potential 
damage of this incident contributed to the Reagan 
Administration's agreement to a request from Kuwait - then 
an Iraqi ally - to re-flag Kuwaiti oil tankers and protect 
them against Iranian attacks in Operation Earnest will 
between July 1987 and August 1988. [7J 
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After Iranian mines disabled a US frigate, a united states 
retaliatory strike in April 1988 sunk "a considerable 
portion of the Iranian navy". [8] This operation co-incided 
with major Iraqi offensives and added to the pressures on 
Iran to seek a cease-fire. 
By 1990 serious strains had emerged between Iraq and the 
united states. At issue was Saddam's threat to strike 
Israel with chemical weapons, should Israel repeat its 1981 
strike on Iraqi nuclear facilities, and the detection of 
Iraqi efforts to illegally import nuclear weapons components 
by American and British authorities. However, these 
incidents had not fatally ruptured Iraqi-US relations and in 
July 1990 the united states was still seeking better 
relations with Baghdad. 
The occupation of Kuwait was completed within 48 hours of 
the Iraqi invasion on August 2 1990. However, the timing of 
Saddam's demarche proved unfortunate for Iraq. The invasion 
deeply offended the "moral framework" of President Bush, 
which was predicated on respect for the norms of 
international law and behaviour. (Bush could accept 
Saddam's pre-war oppression of Iraqi Kurds; he could not 
tolerate Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait following the invasion). 
[9] 
Les Aspin, then Chairman of the House of Representatives 
Armed Services Committee, succinctly expressed us concerns 
in the Gulf Crisis as "oil, aggression and nukes". [10] By 
invading Kuwait, Saddam had acquired control over 15 per 
cent of the world's known oil reserves; in August 1990 Saudi 
Arabia, which held a further 20 per cent of these reserves, 
also appeared vulnerable to Iraq. 
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In ·1990 one US intelligence assessment estimated that Iraq's 
nuclear research program could produce weapons by 1995. [llJ 
united states' concerns about this incipient capability were 
aggravated by Iraq's recent efforts to illegally expedite 
its nuclear program. Iraqi scientists who defected after 
the Gulf War indicated that Iraq was actually ahead of this 
forecast and had planned "to complete a bomb by the end of 
1991". [12J 
To most countries Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was a very 
clear-cut, even anachronistic, case of aggression. This, 
combined with incidents such as Saddam's attempts to exploit 
foreign hostages meant that the case against him was in many 
ways self-evident. 
The united states was able to exploit circumstances such as 
its vastly improved relations with the Soviet Union, and its 
manageable relations with China resulting from President 
Bush's modest reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre in 
1989, to quickly translate the near universal condemnation 
of the invasion into direct action against Iraq. 
Between August and November 1990 the Bush Administration's 
focus shifted from crisis management through political, 
economic and diplomatic pressure on Saddam, to a preparation 
for crisis resolution through direct military action. [13J 
US diplomatic efforts culminated in UN Security Council 
Resolution 678 of 29 November which demanded Iraq's 
unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait by 15 January 1991, and 
authorised "the use of all necessary means" to enforce it. 
The rapid evaporation of Cold War tensions is illustrated by 
the collaboration of the Soviet union against a state which 
had until recently been its most important Middle Eastern 
client. The wording of Resolution 678 was finally 
determined between the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
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Shevardnazde and US Secretary of State James Baker. [14J 
Soviet participation helped make possible a legal framework 
for international military actions, led by the Soviets' 
recent Cold War adversary, against their recent mutual 
client. 
*** 
The military balance between the Coalition and Iraq in mid-
January 1991 was defined not only by the raw numbers of each 
side's personnel and equipment, but also by the 
effectiveness of their respective command and control (C2) 
arrangements, the relevance of their operational doctrine 
and recent military experience to the strategic 
circumstances of the imminent conflict, and indeed by how 
well such lessons had been absorbed. 
The strategies of the two sides also reflected their 
contrasting political objectives and vulnerabilities. The 
Coalition held the advantage over Iraq in most military 
capabilities. However, the Coalition had a major potential 
vulnerability in relation to Saddam's declared intention of 
involving Israel in the imminent conflict at the earliest 
opportunity. 
In effect, the tension between the united States' need to 
maintain the commitment of its Arab partners to the 
Coalition, while simultaneously preserving its traditional 
commitment to the security of Israel, amplified the, at 
best, modest strategic potential of Iraq's intermediate-
range Scud (SS-10) missiles. 
The military effect of the Scuds was compared by an Israeli 
official to a flying dustbin: "if they hit you on the head 
its very nasty, but otherwise its a load of rubbish". [15J 
The Scuds had a circular error probable of approximately 2km 
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under optimum conditions; however, despite this limited 
effectiveness, Iraqi Scud strikes very nearly brought Israel 
into the war in the first days of the conflict. 
Even Syria, Israel's most inveterate adversary since 1948, 
may have tolerated some kind of Israeli counter-strike on 
Iraq and remained in the Coalition. However, any Israeli 
intervention had unpredictable implications, not least of 
which was the possibility of Israeli nuclear retaliation 
should Iraq use chemical weapons. [16J The suppression of 
Scud strikes therefore required a disproportionate effort 
which for a time reduced the number of air strikes on other 
targets. [17J 
The Coalition's political vulnerability was an important 
factor underlying the united States' objective of 
successfully concluding the Gulf War as soon as possible 
with minimum loss. Another factor related to the lessons 
learned from the failure of united states' intervention in 
the vietnam War between 1961 and 1973. 
Among these lessons were, firstly, the perception that 
domestic support for military action against Iraq would 
quickly erode if high casualties were sustained. This was a 
view shared by Saddam, but one which possibly misread 
history. Majority support for US intervention in vietnam 
existed as late as 1968; thereafter disenchantment with the 
war was probably less a matter of its cost and more a matter 
of it being perceived as unwinnable. [18J 
Secondly, it was considered that attempts to send political 
signals through the incremental and selective use of force 
would fail; as would attempts to micro-manage the war 
through the political selection or exclusion of targets, as 
with the exemption of Hanoi and Haiphong from target lists 
for extended periods in the vietnam War. 
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Thirdly, the effectiveness of air operations in vietnam was 
perceived to have been hampered not only by frequent pauses 
but also by segregated service command arrangements leading 
to separate, un-coordinated air campaigns. [19] 
The specific outcomes of these lessons in the Gulf War 
included, firstly, the extension of the air campaign for as 
long as possible to minimise Coalition casualties in a 
ground attack. Moreover, although most senior us commanders 
considered that a ground campaign would be necessary, they 
"saw no need .. to preclude the possibility of the air 
campaign doing the trick". [20] 
Secondly, General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), advised Bush early in the Gulf 
Crisis on "the major lesson of Vietnam", to use military 
force with maximum and constant impact. [21] 
The rejection of the notion of civilian 'micro-management' 
of air target lists was emphasised by the lateness of the 
briefing (January 14 1991) provided by General Powell to the 
Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, on the detailed target 
set. (Cheney ordered some minor revisions to it). 
President Bush was "not informed of the detailed target 
list". [22] 
Thirdly, although 37 different countries, and 11 national 
air forces, were represented in the Coalition, the principle 
of unified command was preserved through overall operational 
command residing with CENTCOM, as discussed below. 
Finally, the efforts at reinvigorating the American military 
after vietnam produced the doctrine of AirLand Battle, which 
was promulgated as a joint US Army-USAF doctrine in 1984. 
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The Doctrine was based on using American advantages in 
technology and firepower "to win" a war. [23J 
AirLand Battle was intended to be a "global warfighting 
doctrine" adaptable to any conflict. [24J However, the 
doctrine would appear most applicable where geographic and 
other conditions permitted operations to be mounted from the 
'forward edge of battle' to an opponent's rear areas and 
higher headquarters - such as in the KTO and Iraq. 
On August 8 1990 President Bush announced the deployment of 
US air and ground forces to Saudi Arabia to deter any 
further Iraqi aggression. The first us forces to arrive in 
Saudi Arabia were two squadrons of F-15 fighters on August 7 
(local time). Bush's announcement followed a mission by 
Secretary Cheney to Saudi Arabia. Cheney presented 
satellite imagery detailing the offensive posture of Iraqi 
forces on the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. This convinced King 
Fahd to invite foreign forces into his kingdom - a highly 
sensitive decision given the deep Islamic conservatism of 
Saudi society. [25J 
While "the exact sequence of events .. remains unclear", in 
late October 1990 President Bush authorised a doubling of 
both US ground forces and combat aircraft deployed to the 
Gulf theatre. [26J This increase would later permit CENTCOM 
to conduct parallel attacks on Iraqi fielded forces and 
strategic targets. 
The announcement of these additional commitments was delayed 
until 8 November 1990 - two days after the US Congressional 
elections and 3 weeks before the UN authorised the use of 
force against Iraq. President Bush declared that the 
additional forces would provide an "adequate offensive 
military option, should that become necessary .. ". 
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Coalition Command and Control 
By February 1991 the united states had deployed 527,000 
military personnel out of a Coalition total of over 700,000, 
1,990 aircraft out of a final total of at least 2,614 
aircraft, and 2,000 out of 3,500 tanks. This predominance 
required and assured the exercise of operational command 
over Coalition forces by CENTCOM, the unified (joint 
service) command responsible for us military operations in 
south-west Asia and most of the Middle East. [27J 
The 1986 US Goldwater-Nichols Act "placed full command of 
all forces in the field in the hands of the respective field 
commander", subordinate to the CJCS. [28J General 
Schwarzkopf, as the Commander-in-Chief Central Command 
(CINCENT), held theatre-wide responsibility over the 
development of operational plans and their execution. The 
united states' Coalition partners exercised full national 
command over their forces and maintained "the communications 
necessary to direct these forces for national purposes". 
[29J However, CENTCOM exercised operational command over 
these forces. 
The difficult task of reconciling these two potentially 
conflicting command concepts was accomplished by the 
formation of a Coalition Coordination communications and 
Integration Center (CCCIC) to integrate separate lines of 
national command and, as far as possible, by devolution of 
tasks to national forces, and individual us services, 
consistent with their capabilities. [30J 
This devolution reduced problems of interoperability between 
different national forces, as did the establishment of 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) between the national 
air forces. [31J The Coalition also benefited from the 
familiarity established among its NATO members with each 
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others operational procedures and the commonality 
established between the USAF and the Royal Saudi Air Force 
(RSAF) . 
General Khalid Ibn Sultan of Saudi Arabia commanded Saudi 
forces and exercised operational control over participating 
Muslim forces. Schwarzkopf's subordinate, USAF Lieutenant 
General Charles A. Horner, was appointed Joint Forces Air 
Component Commander (JFACC) with command over all Coalition 
air forces. Horner's headquarters was located in the USAF 
Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) in Riyadh, which co-
ordinated the operations of the various national air forces. 
The TACC developed a single Air Tasking Order (ATO) which, 
in the earlier part of the air war when targets were mostly 
known and generally fixed, assigned targets on a daily basis 
to all Coalition combat aircraft and cruise missiles. [32J 
The ATO provided a very detailed 'shooting-script' for the 
air campaign - about 600 pages long - and it is difficult to 
see how the complex operations sustained by the Coalition 
could have been conducted without the operational control 
and co-ordination provided by a single ATO. 
However, there were difficulties in distributing ATO data 
throughout the theatre. In particular, the incompatibility 
of the communications links on-board USN aircraft with the 
communications equipment of other US services meant that the 
USN's copy of the ATO had to be hand-delivered to a command 
ship. USN aircraft "were not easily absorbed into the ATO" 
as a result of this and other difficulties. [33J 
Additionally, disagreements over targeting priorities led to 
the withdrawal of many united states Marine Corps (USMC) 
assets from the ATO. [34J 
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The early French attitudes to the command and control of 
their Armee de l'air contingent illustrates the potential 
for serious command problems within the Coalition. Before 
November 1990, France's Defence Minister insisted that 
French aircraft would be restricted to operations to protect 
ground forces. French aircraft were based as far as 
possible from the major Saudi centre of Dharhran "to 
demonstrate their independence from the US". [35] French 
aircraft were not authorised to strike targets in Iraq until 
after the war commenced, and the Defence Minister had 
resigned. 
A series of electronic support networks were required to 
maintain effective command and control of Coalition forces. 
The Coalition benefited enormously from the long lead-time 
provided between August 1990 and January 1991 for the 
installation of these networks. "six months were needed to 
set-up and debug" the communications and information systems 
upon which the integration of Coalition operations depended. 
[36] 
Rochlin and Demchak have concluded that the length of this 
lead-time, relative to Iraq's actual capabilities, raises 
disturbing organisational issues associated with the ability 
of US forces to cope with more demanding opponents than 
Iraq. [37] Their view is relevant to possible contingencies 
where a comparable preparation time would not be available. 
However, the Coalition had to install its C3I system 
virtually 'from scratch' and this represented a critical 
achievement. [38] In addition, the potential difficulties 
cited by Rochlin and Demchak provide a continuing case for 
aircraft carriers in more improvised deployments, given that 
the carriers carry their C3I structure with them. [39] 
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Intelligence 
John Keegan has observed that "commanders must know a great 
deal before they act and see what they are about to do" -
they must have effective intelligence and control. He also 
notes that "the problem of real-time intelligence probably 
defies [a perfect] solution [because] those moments .. when 
the flow of information upwards and orders downwards will 
most nearly match the pace of events - are very, very few". 
[40J 
Keegan's observations are apposite to the Coalition's 
intelligence operations and their impact on the air 
campaign. The 5 months between the invasion of Kuwait and 
the commencement of Operation Desert storm provided the 
Coalition forces with the great asset of time to 'know and 
see' their enemy - including time to update their electronic 
warfare (EW) systems to KTO conditions with detailed mapping 
of Iraqi EW and C3 targets, (and to reprogram threat 
libraries on Airborne Early Warning (AEW) systems). [41J 
The Coalition had access to very advanced intelligence 
collection assets, including up to 7 US reconnaissance 
satellites and up to 100 reconnaissance aircraft. However, 
although the us military was "strong on information 
gathering .. it was very weak on intelligence and information 
assessment". [42J 
The Coalition's intelligence difficulties are an issue where 
independent and official views converge. General 
Schwarzkopf noted that the need to enhance US battlefield 
intelligence capabilities was one of the most important 
lessons of the war. [43J Frank Kendall stated that overall 
"battlefield surveillance was not commensurate with the 
capability of our munitions". [44J 
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Specific shortfalls in Coalition intelligence collection and 
assessment included, firstly, the under-estimation of the 
numbers of Iraq's Scud missiles. CENTCOM was embarrassed 
when its early claims that most Scuds had been destroyed 
were revealed to be premature by the Iraqi use of mobile 
launchers. [45J The Coalition subsequently encountered 
considerable difficulties in locating and destroying these 
launchers. Secondly, the number of Iraqi nuclear facilities 
was significantly under-estimated in pre-war intelligence 
collection. [46J 
Thirdly, the use of out-dated information led to a strike on 
an Iraqi C3 facility in the Baghdad suburb of Amiriyah on 
February 12/13. 314 Iraqi civilians died in this strike and 
the adverse international reactions to it were described at 
the time as potentially "one of the war's turning points". 
[47 J 
General Schwarzkopf had set a bench-mark of a 50 per cent 
reduction in the Iraqi Army's capabilities to be reached 
before Desert Sword began. The timing of the ground 
offensive appeared to be one of the Coalition's most 
critical decisions. [48J If it was launched prematurely, 
Iraqi resistance might have been higher; if it was launched 
too late, other factors such as hotter weather, the Muslim 
festival of Ramadan in March and international sensitivity 
regarding the prolonged bombing of Iraq could also have 
created difficulties. 
CENTCOM encountered early difficulties in assessing 
battlefield damage inflicted on the Iraqi Army by air 
strikes, and its claims were disputed by the more 
conservative estimates of US intelligence agencies, 
particularly the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). [49J 
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Some of these difficulties were outside CENTCOM's control. 
Satellite coverage was hindered by cloud cover which 
persisted over the theatre for 3 weeks of the 6 week war. 
Of the 7 US military intelligence satellites available, only 
1, the Lacrosse radar imaging satellite, could penetrate 
cloud cover. Moreover, the Lacrosse did not have a wide-
area imaging capability and was therefore of limited use in 
collecting intelligence on the Iraqi Army. [50J 
This task was also initially assigned a lower priority than 
strategic targets in Iraq and Scud missiles. These 
difficulties resulted in duplication of air strike effort 
and the failure to locate some targets, such as the main 
ammunition and supply depot in Kuwait. [51J 
CENTCOM's bomb damage assessment had improved by early 
February, partly because of better intelligence on the 
results of earlier strikes. [52J Nevertheless, it appears 
that the timing of the ground offensive was finally 
determined by a number of factors. 
These included what was essentially a best guess of the 
effectiveness of the air campaign (see p.78); the reasoning 
that the Coalition could not wait indefinitely for perfect 
bomb damage intelligence; the desire to avoid another 
Amiriyah incident, the minimum moonlight prevailing after 
February 17; and perhaps most convincing of all, the growing 
numbers of Iraqi troops surrendering to Coalition forces. 
Freedman and Karsh also note that the CIA's conservative 
estimates "might have had more influence" if [CIA Director] 
William Webster had more influence in Bush's 'inner-circle'. 
[53J 
These issues indicate that the Coalition's intelligence 
operations did not provide a perfect solution to the real-
time intelligence problem described by Keegan. However, the 
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Coalition benefited greatly from the passivity of the Iraqi 
Army which meant that the pace of events more closely 
matched the flow of information to CENTCOM. [54] 
The ATO was not a perfect solution to real-time targeting. 
As it was prepared 48 hours in advance of operations it was 
ill-suited for tasking operations against targets such as 
the mobile SCUD launchers. However, Saddam's decision to 
confine most of his front-line forces in static defensive 
positions greatly assisted the correlation of the 
Coalition's intelligence flows with its strike operations. 
Plans 
The use of air power against Iraq featured prominently in 
united states military planning from the outset of the Gulf 
Crisis. While there were conflicting views on the 
capabilities of the Iraqi Army, the united states and its 
partners were confident of their advantages in air power. 
General Schwarzkopf focused on the likely vulnerability of 
the Iraqi Army to air attack in his initial briefing to the 
National Security Council on August 4 1990. [55] The basic 
plan for phased offensive air operations against Iraq was 
developed by the end of August. [56] 
There was no argument with the need to suppress Iraq's air 
defence system as a first priority. However, the subsequent 
focus of air operations was vigorously disputed between USAF 
target planners in Washington on the one hand and their Army 
and Navy counterparts - and indeed to some extent Lieutenant 
General Horner - on the other. [57] 
The concept of the Coalition's four-phased air campaign 
against Iraq was developed in a Pentagon planning cell known 
as 'Checkmate', directed by USAF Colonel John Warden. 
Colonel Warden had published a book in 1989 which reaffirmed 
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the theory of the decisiveness of strategic air campaigns. 
He had also developed a targeting hierarchy based on 
discrete centres of strategic gravity, in which attacks on 
an opponent's field forces have the least critical value - a 
priority at odds with Army and Navy views. [58J 
Horner opposed Checkmate's emphasis on strategic targets. 
He considered that it entailed "the Air Force fighting its 
own war" and thus deviated from a fundamental principle of 
AirLand Battle. [59J According to Freedman and Karsh "the 
USAF could not resist the opportunity to demonstrate a 
decisive [independent] strategic role". [60J (It is 
therefore ironic that the strategic targets selected by 
Checkmate were criticised by Dugan for their orthodoxy and, 
in excluding Saddam, their insufficiency). 
By his own account, General Schwarzkopf was initially 
"leery" of Warden's published views on strategic air power. 
However, Schwarzkopf endorsed Checkmate's plan in mid-
August, principally because Warden's presentation placed as 
much emphasis on close air support for ground operations as 
for strategic operations. [61J This also presumably allowed 
a compromise between different targeting priorities. 
Checkmate's outline plan (designated Instant Thunder to 
deliberately distinguish it from the American Operation 
Rolling Thunder over North vietnam in 1965) was passed to 
Horner's head-quarters in Riyadh for detailed development 
(see p.59). However, despite Schwarzkopf's endorsement, the 
dispute over targeting priorities was never resolved "to the 
point where the ground commanders were entirely happy with 
the performance of the Air Force". [62J 
Pimlott and Badsey assert that "American conservatism in 
planning and fighting the war is partly explained by 
anxieties over how well .. largely untried technology would 
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work". They note that, while new weapons technologies have 
frequently had genuinely revolutionary implications, their 
initial impact has historically been softened by the 
conservative influence of prevailing doctrine - as with 
"submarines or aircraft .. before 1914, or tanks before 1939". 
[63J 
This analysis is at odds with the claim that the 
technological aspects of air power caught up with its 
prophetic doctrine in the Gulf War. It also raises the 
question of which institutional view of the conduct of air 
campaigns was the more conservative in the light of the 
technology available in 1990: the USAF planners in 
Washington with their alleged adherence to old ideas of the 
strategic primacy of air power; or the Army and Navy's 
devaluation of the alleged potential of modern air power to 
defeat an opponent in a less sanguinary manner than direct 
attacks on troops. 
Coalition air strength 
Estimates of the number of Coalition aircraft vary - Waters 
calculates that 2,614 aircraft were available at the start 
of the war; Sibbald gives a lower estimate of 2,430 aircraft 
as at January 16/17 but notes that this was increased to 
2,790 aircraft available by the start of Desert Sword. [64J 
Table 1 on the next page details the size of different 
national contributions to the Coalition's air strength. 
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Table 1: Coalition aircraft by national source. 
country Fighter Tanker Airlift other 
united 1323 285 175 207 
states 
Saudi 276 15 38 10 
Arabia 
UK 57 9 3 4 
France 44 3 12 7 
Kuwait 40 3 
Canada 26 2 
Bahrain 24 
Qatar 20 
UAE 20 
Italy 8 
New 3 
Zealand 
Total 1838 312 234 230 
Source: Gary Waters, Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air 
Power, Canberra, 1992, pp. 39-40 
Coalition aircraft included 328 air superiority fighters 
(mainly F-15 C/D Eagles and F-14A Tomcats); 414 multi-role 
fighters (F-15Es, F-16 C/D Falcons and F/A-18 Hornets); 342 
all-weather strike aircraft, including F-111F Pave Tacks and 
F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter-bombers; up to 80 USAF B-
52G heavy bombers; 415 Close Air Support/Battlefield Air 
Interdiction (CAS/BAI) aircraft, including 168 USAF A-10 
Thunderbolts; 95 Electronic Warfare/Suppression of Enemy Air 
Defence (SEAD) aircraft; and 119 reconnaissance and AEW 
aircraft. [65J 
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The latter group included 8 USAF and 5 RSAF Airborne Warning 
And Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, 2 prototype USAF E-8A 
Joint surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems (J-STARS) 
aircraft, and two Airborne Command and Control Center 
(ABCCC) EC-130 aircraft. These 3 aircraft types "were 
critical to the direction and co-ordination of air 
operations". [66J 
The AWACS aircraft have two primary functions: to detect and 
control interceptions on hostile aircraft and to prevent 
fratricide of friendly aircraft. The first task proved less 
demanding than expected because the Iraqi Air Force made 
only limited attempts to engage Coalition forces. 
However, these capabilities were notably demonstrated when, 
probably in deference to Coalition solidarity, an AWACS 
aircraft cleared friendly aircraft away from two Iraqi 
Mirages and directed a Saudi pilot to their interception. 
[67J (This was the only air-to-air engagement of the war 
where Iraqi aircraft were not destroyed by US aircraft). 
The AWACS were highly effective in preventing fratricide 
incidents; it is remarkable that these were entirely avoided 
throughout the 43 day conflict, in which the Coalition 
launched an average of 2,500 sorties per day. 
The J-STARS aircraft are designed to provide long-range 
surveillance of enemy ground targets and movements. The two 
used in the Gulf War were rushed from development programs 
and deployed 5 days before the war. They provided 
particularly valuable intelligence on mobile targets such as 
Scud launchers and Iraqi Army formations. The real-time 
targeting capability provided by J-STARS aircraft provided a 
remedy to the relative inflexibility of the ATO, especially 
in the 'Scud hunt'. [68J 
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The ABCCC aircraft provided air battle co-ordination and the 
direction of aircraft against specific targets. The 
operations of all three aircraft types were co-ordinated 
through an air-to-air and air-to-ground communications 
system called the Joint Tactical Information Distribution 
System (JTIDS). [69J 
The US Army deployed 185 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and 
a number of other helicopter types. Apaches conducted the 
first air strike of the war and featured prominently in 
ground-attack missions during Operation Desert Sword. 
US command authorities were confident that the united states 
and its partners could achieve an early air superiority 
against Iraq, despite their pre-war predictions of high US 
attrition rates. [70J 
While the Iraqi Air Force's(IAF) campaign against Iranian 
cities and other strategic targets during the Iran-Iraq war 
contributed substantially to Iran's defeat, most assessments 
concurred that the Coalition air forces held clear 
qualitative advantages over the IAF, including the much 
greater depth of their operational experience and training. 
[71J 
Given that CENTCOM planned an air campaign conducted with 
maximum and constant impact, an important indicator of these 
qualitative advantages is mission capability rates. The 
USAF achieved rates greater than 85 per cent for most of its 
combat/strike aircraft. This represented an average 
increase of 7.1 per cent over peacetime mission capabilities 
- a marked contrast to the IAF's maintenance difficulties 
described below. [72J 
The Coalition's air campaign involved much longer sortie 
durations than in peacetime norms. The average duration of 
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an F-117A sortie, for instance, was 5.4 hours compared with 
a peacetime average of 1.6 hours. [73] (The F-117As high 
sortie durations also reflected the basing of these very 
valuable aircraft in the south-west corner of Saudi Arabia 
at a maximum distance from any Iraqi threat). The large 
distances between Coalition air bases and Iraqi targets, 
coupled with the need to sustain high sortie rates, made the 
role of Air-to-Air Refuelling Tankers particularly critical. 
The high sortie durations of Coalition aircraft also 
increased their maintenance requirements. 
The Coalition's qualitative advantages in air power were 
amplified by the very rapid deployment of united states' and 
other Coalition aircraft to the Middle East. The Coalition 
achieved a quantitative superiority in combat aircraft 
against Iraq in just over 4 weeks after the invasion of 
Kuwait - and, as noted, had doubled this strength again by 
January 1991. [74] 
Iraqi Forces 
critical details of Saddam Hussein's strategy against the 
Coalition remain obscure and attempts to reconstruct them 
remain dependent on 'best-guesses'. It seems improbable 
that he expected Iraq to defeat the Coalition - Saddam was 
reluctant to risk his air force in ventures larger than 
'penny-packet' operations, and he did not commit the 
Republican Guard, Iraq's elite force, to forward positions 
because "he dare not risk its loss". [75] (Indeed, the 
survival of the Republican Guard enabled Saddam in turn to 
survive the civil unrest which followed the war) . 
It has been suggested that Saddam's decision to halt his 
forces at the Saudi border forfeited the strategic surprise 
he achieved in the invasion of Kuwait and that this, 
combined with his failure to disrupt the Coalition build-up 
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in Saudi Arabia, effectively determined the outcome of the 
Gulf War. It has also, however, been pointed out that this 
halt reflected the strain the invasion imposed on Iraqi 
logistical capabilities - as the withdrawal of some Iraqi 
units from Kuwait shortly after the invasion indicated. [76J 
The clearest element of Saddam's strategy was his attempt to 
destabilise the Coalition by provoking an Israeli 
intervention. By basing his military options on an 
intensive defence against both air and ground attacks, 
Saddam may have also sought to raise the cost of a Coalition 
victory to the point where it enabled him to emerge as a 
political victor from the war. At a best result, this might 
have permitted Saddam to retain some of his gains in Kuwait. 
[77J 
Iraq's Integrated Air Defence System (lADS) was based on the 
Soviet model of centralised control over both the IAF and 
ground-based air defences. The IAF's very limited impact on 
the air war confirmed pre-war assessments that it was "the 
most obvious weakness in the Iraqi military structure". [78J 
Nevertheless, the IAF, like the Iraqi Army, was 
characterised as much by the unevenness of its capabilities 
as by more general deficiencies. 
The IAF "had the numbers" - between 500 and 800 aircraft -
to seriously disrupt initial Coalition attacks, particularly 
if the lADS network functioned as intended and effectively 
co-ordinated ground and air defences. [79J However, the IAF 
suffered from serious training and maintenance deficiencies 
and aircraft of uneven quality. [80J 
The IAF possessed between 320 and 370 interceptors, 
including over 50 MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters. While a very 
capable aircraft, the MiG-29 is difficult to maintain, and 
its effectiveness was substantially degraded by the 
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withdrawal of soviet technical support. [81J The IAF's 
interceptor force was supplemented by 328 Mirage F.1 dual-
role fighters with an Exocet anti-ship missile capability. 
The F.1 had accounted for the majority of Iraqi air-to-air 
kills in the Iran-Iraq War and its pilots included the small 
number trusted to receive foreign training. [82J Iraq 
possessed about 24 Su-24 Fencer bombers which represented 
its only modern strategic-strike aircraft. 
The IAF's maintenance deficiencies were indicated in an 
estimate that approximately 175 Iraqi aircraft were 
unserviceable in January 1991. [83J The IAF's capabilities 
were compromised by the withdrawal of the technical support 
services provided by France and the soviet Union, and their 
release of technical data on Iraqi equipment to the united 
states. [84J 
The poor training of many Iraqi pilots was an even more 
critical deficiency. This is illustrated by an incident on 
January 17 1991, reconstructed by Sibbald, when an Iraqi 
MiG-29 pilot shot down his wingman before colliding with the 
debris and being destroyed himself. 
"Apparently unaccustomed to the sophisticated air-to-air 
radar of the MiG, the Iraqi pilot had simply taped the radar 
button down so that it locked on to the first target it 
acquired .. being of a nervous disposition, the pilot also 
kept his firing button permanently depressed .. ". [85J (As 
both planes were destroyed it is not clear how Sibbald 
reconstructed this event). 
The IAF flew around 200 sorties per day immediately before 
the war - less than a quarter of its potential. This 
probably reflected the impact of the UN's economic 
sanctions; it meant that Iraqi pilots were poorly trained 
for such tasks as air-to-air refuelling and night-flying. 
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The IAF lacked an effective Identification Friend or Foe 
(IFF) signalling system, as also suggested by the fratricide 
incident on January 17. [86J 
USAF personnel described Iraq's ground-based air defence 
network as the most concentrated system of its kind outside 
of the Soviet union. [87J Major elements of this network 
included approximately 70 area-defence surface-to-air 
missile (SAM) batteries under IAF control, and up to 140 
point-defence SAM batteries under Iraqi Army control - in 
total approximately 7,000 individual SAMs. The Iraqi Army 
also deployed approximately 4,000 anti-aircraft artillery 
(AAA) guns which covered major Iraqi cities and other 
strategic centres. [88J 
Iraq's airspace was divided into four regional defensive 
zones, each controlled by a major C3 centre which identified 
and assigned targets to air and ground assets. [89J The lADS 
network was supported by approximately 100 
surveillance/acquisition and early warning radars with 
hardened C3 facilities. [90J The network incorporated a 
redundancy of communications and other system elements to 
provide 'graceful degradation' under attack. [91J 
The Iraqi Army operated a separate air defence system in the 
KTO which included numerous man-portable SA-7 and SA-14 
missile systems. These constituted a threat throughout the 
war to Coalition aircraft conducting low-altitude ground-
attack missions. 
Overall, Iraq's lADS constituted a major national investment 
with some 'state of the art' elements. Its major weakness, 
shared with the Iraqi Army, was a dependency on centralised 
control. The concentration of C3 functions in a relatively 
small number of central nodes made the entire network 
vulnerable to strikes with precision weapons. This physical 
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destruction may have been less debilitating had operational 
authority been decentralised. [92J 
However, Saddam's insistence on centralised command meant 
that commanders at all levels "were unable to take decisions 
or initiate actions". [93J This contributed to "the 
paralysis of Iraq's armed forces" in the Gulf War, which was 
compounded by Saddam's mis-reading of the implications of 
the Iran-Iraq War. [94J The IAF's attacks on Iranian cities 
and other strategic targets in 1988 had reinforced the 
impact of the Iraqi Army's offensives; Saddam's decision to 
adopt a defensive strategy in 1991 ignored both these 
lessons. 
Iraq deployed between 350,000 and, by the Pentagon's initial 
estimate, 545,000 troops in the KTO. The Pentagon's 
estimate was later generally considered to be too high. 
Tamayo and Woodward calculated that 350,000 Iraqi troops 
were deployed in the KTO on January 17, but that Iraqi 
strength had fallen to as low as 200,000 men by the start of 
the ground war - largely through desertions. [95J 
The Pentagon estimate was based on the 43 Iraqi divisions in 
the KTO (out of a total of 60 army divisions) identified in 
satellite imagery. However, prisoner-of-war interrogations 
later indicated that many units were well below strength, 
and that desertions exceeded the Pentagon estimate of 
150,000 troops. [96J 
The Pentagon estimated that Iraq deployed 4,280 tanks, 2,750 
other armoured fighting vehicles, and 3,100 artillery pieces 
in the KTO. These figures were also subsequently disputed, 
although one analyst estimated that the Iraqi Army deployed 
greater quantities of heavy weapons in the KTO than 
officially estimated. [97J 7 of the 8 Republican Guard 
divisions were deployed to the northern sector of the KTO as 
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a mobile theatre reserve, or for recall if an internal 
threat emerged. [98J 
Assessments of the Iraqi Army's capabilities differed 
markedly before the Gulf War. Some maintained that the 
Iraqi Army's offensives against Iran were usually successful 
only in conjunction with (frequently unreliable) chemical 
weapons attacks. However, others considered the Iraqi Army 
to be a highly capable force which could prove difficult to 
overcome. Antal's analysis written in early 1991, and a 
subsequent Pentagon assessment, noted the Iraqi Army's 
evolution into a force capable of conducting deep, combined-
arms offensives against Iran. [99J 
This success makes Saddam's defensive strategy more 
surprising, particularly when the sUbstantial Iraqi 
desertions early in the Iran-Iraq War, after Saddam had 
"voluntarily surrendered the initiative to Iran" 
demonstrated the consequences of passivity. [100J 
Saddam's defensive strategy is explicable in the light of 
the Iraqi logistical difficulties, and his perception that 
the united States could not sustain heavy casualties, 
already cited. It was nevertheless flawed, although a more 
mobile strategy would have required a level of support from 
the IAF which was unlikely to be present. 
The Iraqi Army had constructed a layered defensive system 
(the 'Saddam line') across Kuwait's southern border. These 
defences increased the potential cost of an early Coalition 
ground offensive, especially one based on a frontal assault. 
However, the Saddam line terminated a short distance west of 
the Kuwaiti-saudi border and was therefore vulnerable to an 
outflanking manoeuvre. 
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Although this option was discussed in the Western media 
before the war, there is no evidence that Iraqi commanders 
seriously considered it. They apparently considered Iraq's 
interior to be unsuitable for heavy armour - as initially 
did some Coalition commanders. [101] 
The US Army XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps were 
repositioned during the air campaign to their start lines 
for the out-flanking manoeuvre. Their respective movements 
involved distances of 800 km and 400km. [102] That they 
could accomplish this without Iraqi detec~ion indicates the 
early general collapse of Iraqi intelligence collection 
capabilities. [103] This collapse throws into relief the 
otherwise limited benefits Iraq derived from continuing 
access to US weather satellite data through the war. The 
predictions of cloud cover derived from this data enabled 
Scud launches to be scheduled accordingly. [104] 
Neither the Iraqi Army's logistical nor its command problems 
were resolved by Saddam's defensive strategy (see pp.74-75). 
Its potential effectiveness was also degraded by his under-
estimation of the capability of the Coalition's PGMs to 
severely attrit his army. [105] Despite its difficulties in 
assessing bomb damage, the Coalition destroyed Iraq's 
ability to challenge its ground offensive, "where Saddam had 
once assumed his forces could be employed to their greatest 
advantage", by prolonging the air campaign. [106] 
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CHAPTER 3 - AIR OPERATIONS 
The air campaign sought to gain air supremacy, disrupt Iraqi 
command and control, destroy a range of Iraqi strategic-
economic targets including its nuclear, biological and 
chemical (NBC) warfare capabilities in Phase 1; suppress 
enemy air defences in the KTO in Phase 2; and interdict C3 
links between Iraqi command authorities and their forces in 
the field, and 'shape the battlefield' with direct attacks 
on these forces in Phase 3. [lJ 
These phases were scheduled to continue for 30 days. While 
both naval and ground operations, including the use of 
Special Forces teams operating inside Iraq and Kuwait, were 
incorporated in Desert Storm, air operations were 
predominant. 
These operations would be immediately followed by Phase 4 -
Desert Sword - involving a ground offensive supported by air 
and naval operations against the Iraqi Army "to exploit the 
shock effect" of the air campaign. [2J 
The plan for Desert Sword was based on a deep out-flanking 
manoeuvre west of the junction of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti-Saudi 
borders which, coupled with more direct approaches into 
Kuwait, aimed to trap Iraqi forces in a double-envelopment. 
These thrusts were to be supported by feints, such as 
rehearsals for an amphibious assault that never came and 
electronic deceptions, designed to fix Iraqi attention on 
the eastern flank of the KTO. [3J 
The number of aircraft available enabled CENTCOM to commence 
parallel strikes on the full range of Iraqi target sets from 
the outset. The originally discrete operational phases were 
thus merged - in particular, the IAF's general inactivity 
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Table 2: Iraqi strategic targets 
TARGET NUMBER SORTIES 
Electric power 28 215 
Naval 20 247 
National Command 26 429 
Authority 
Air Defence 29 436 
oil 28 518 
C3 170 601 
Transportation 54 712 
NBC 31 902 
Military support 96 2,756 
Scuds*l 30 2,767 
Airfields 66 3,047 
Republican Guard 145 5,646 
TOTAL 723 18,276 
1* The number of Scud targets appears to refer to the number of fixed 
launch sites identified before January 17; most Coalition sorties were 
against mobile launchers. 
Source: Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-91,p.330, from 
various sources including CENTCOM, Greenpeace. 
The integration of Iraq's civil and military sectors down to 
the level of individual facilities meant that strikes on 
many targets, such as the Amiriyah C3 facility, ran the risk 
of causing civilian casualties, despite the care taken to 
minimise them. [6J 
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The political repercussions of civilian casualties were 
self-evident to the Coalition. However, despite the 
intensity of the air campaign, the number of civilian 
casualties directly attributable to it was limited. An 
official Iraqi estimate calculated that 2,278 civilians were 
killed and 5,965 wounded in the war - totals that were 
greatly exceeded in the civil unrest which followed it. [7J 
However, the immediate effects of the war and its aftermath 
were amplified by another consequence of the air campaign. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the strategic relevance of 
attacks on Iraqi electrical power facilities has been 
questioned. While a relatively small number of strikes, 
215, were launched against electrical power targets, these 
were the most severely damaged Iraqi target set in the war. 
[8J 
The destruction of the Iraqi electrical power system 
contributed to the collapse of Iraqi command and control. 
In addition, many facilities were disabled by thousands of 
carbon-fiber wire reels dispensed by TLAMS. These reels 
short-circuited power plant transmission grids. These 
facilities were claimed to be "soon back in action, thus 
softening the impact of the war on civilians". [9J 
However, the US Defence Department later acknowledged that 
"some target sets, such as electrical power production were 
more heavily damaged than originally planned". [10J The 
difficulty of repairing this system has since impacted 
severely on Iraqi public health. In October 1991 a Harvard 
University team found that the death-rate among Iraqi 
infants had increased four-fold since the war. [llJ 
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Initial attacks and the attainment of air supremacy 
The extent to which the Coalition had been able to compile 
detailed intelligence on Iraq's strategic structure is 
demonstrated by the variety of targets attacked in the first 
24 hours of the war and thereafter. Notwithstanding this, 
shortfalls in intelligence on particular target sets later 
emerged, as noted in Chapter 2. 
While only 45 strategic targets were selected in Baghdad, 
these included centres with a particularly high value to 
Iraqi command and control. CENTCOM's plans were modified 
following General Dugan's remarks that "the cutting edge" of 
the air campaign "would be in downtown Baghdad". 
Anticipating that Baghdad's defences would be strengthened, 
CENTCOM restricted operations against targets in it to F-
117As and cruise missiles. [12J 
Expectations that the Coalition would commence operations 
'sooner rather than later' could have compromised strategic 
surprise and increased losses. However, the Coalition 
achieved strategic surprise through a complex sequence of 
aerial feints coupled with a co-ordinated and massive 
application of main aerial force. 
CENTCOM set 3 am on January 17 as H-Hour. The main-force 
Coalition attacks were preceded shortly before H-Hour by 
Apache helicopter strikes mounted by the US Army's 101st 
Airborne Division. These strikes destroyed Iraqi air 
defence early-warning radar sites in south-west Iraq with 
laser-designated Hellfire missiles. This enabled EW 
aircraft to enter a 'radar-black' corridor into Iraq. [13J 
Large formations of Coalition aircraft flew to and away from 
the Iraqi border on several occasions between November 1990 
and January 1991. This manoeuvre was repeated on the night 
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of January 16/17; when most of their accompanying formation 
turned back, the F-117As, supported by stand-off jamming 
aircraft, flew on to Baghdad undetected. [14J 
The F-117As struck C3 targets in Baghdad, including the 
IAF's headquarters and Iraq's main telecommunications 
facility, at H-Hour, almost simultaneously with TLAMs. 
Elsewhere, other F-117As struck air defence facilities in 
southern Iraq, F-15Es struck SCUD missile launch sites in 
western Iraq and RAF Tornado GR.ls struck Iraqi airfields in 
low-altitude raids. [15J 
The F-117As struck 31 per cent of all Iraqi targets selected 
in the ATO for the first 24 hours of the war, a figure 
rising to 40 per cent by its end. By then the 48 F-117s in 
the theatre had flown 1,271 "of the most dangerous attack 
missions in Desert Storm" for no loss. [16J All F-117 
strikes were conducted with PGMs. This aircraft's high 
success rates against difficult targets, and the fact that 
none were lost, have been cited as proof of the maturation 
and strategic importance of stealth technology. 
However, according to some critics, the initial support 
provided to F-117 missions by EW aircraft puts a different 
slant on the F-117's alleged 'invisibility' to Iraqi radar. 
[17J The F-117s may also have been accompanied by the highly 
classified TR-3A Black Manta delta-wing stealth 
reconnaissance aircraft. The Black Mantas are designed to 
collect and transmit near real-time digital photo data for 
immediate tactical applications. [18J The possible use of 
these aircraft underlines the strategic importance assigned 
to F-117A strikes. 
The USN fired a total of 291 TLAMs at strategic targets in 
the war, 264 of which delivered conventional high explosives 
and 27 which delivered sUb-munitions - including the carbon-
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fibers used to disable power stations. [19] As with other 
operations, uncertainty about the effectiveness of these 
weapons led to multiple strikes on the one target early in 
the war, although CENTCOM's confidence in its weapons 
subsequently increased. [20] 
35 AGM 86C ALCMs were launched from 7 B-52s against electric 
power facilities and C3 targets on January 17 in "the 
longest conventional air strike mission in history" - the B-
52s sortied from Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, about 
18 hours before H-Hour. [21] This operation was the only use 
of ALCMs in the war. 
EF-111A Ravens, EA-6B Intruders and EC-130 Compass Call 
aircraft supported the early strikes with electronic jamming 
of Iraqi radars. As both the EF-111A's jamming equipment 
and much of Iraq's air-defence equipment dated from the 
1970s, this fortuitous matching enabled the EF-111As to 
penetrate Iraq's electronic defences particularly 
effectively. [22] 
The three most significant individual Coalition actions in 
its effort to attain air supremacy were an F-117A attack on 
the IAF's headquarters; SEAD attacks on the Iraqi air 
defence radar network; and the offensive counter-air effort 
against Iraqi airfields and hardened aircraft shelters 
(HAS) . 
As noted in Chapter 2, many analysts have emphasised the 
IAF's poor level of training. However, Coalition action may 
have exacerbated the impact of this factor. A prime reason 
for the IAF's passivity may have been the loss of many of 
its better foreign-trained aircrew in the F-117 strike on 
its Baghdad headquarters on January 17. [23] If so, the 
presence of these pilots in Baghdad rather than with their 
aircraft is surprising. 
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Although it was hardened, this building was above ground. 
Its relative exposure compared to other key Iraqi targets -
Saddam's personal headquarters and the Republican Guard's 
command facilities were located below ground - may have 
illustrated the deep distrust Saddam held towards his armed 
forces. (There were three attempts at a military coup 
against Saddam between 1988 and 1991). [24J 
It appears clear that Saddam enforced a system of 
centralised command and control primarily to ensure his 
political survival, and only secondarily for its military 
benefits. According to McKnight, "the air force was 
particularly feared by Saddam" because of its "well-known 
potential to decapitate a regime" - the IAF's headquarters 
was not only vulnerable to Coalition aircraft, it was also 
vulnerable to the Republican Guard. [25J 
SEAD attacks began 20 minutes after H-Hour and continued for 
the first 3 days of the war. USN aircraft supported these 
attacks with a major deception operation. They released 137 
ADM-141 Tactical Air Launched Decoys (TALDs) which mimicked 
the radar signatures of attacking aircraft. These decoys, 
together with the TLAM attacks and airborne jamming, lured 
the Iraqis into activating or increasing the power levels of 
their radars. [26J In essence, the Iraqi air defence radars 
were manoeuvred towards an electronic feint and were thus 
exposed to the main blow. 
Iraqi attempts to intercept the TALDs with SAMs and fighter 
aircraft revealed the positions of Iraqi 
surveillance/acquisition and SAM guidance radars to the SEAD 
force. These aircraft - USAF F4-G wild Weasels, USN F/A-18s 
and EA-6B Intruders - fired approximately 1,000 High Speed 
Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs) at Iraqi radar sites. [27J 
These attacks were very successful: 100 Iraqi air defence 
radar transmissions were logged in the first 4 hours of the 
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war. Thereafter, only 15 transmissions were logged up to 
January 28. [28J Ironically, the USAF had opposed the TALD 
program on the grounds that stealth aircraft would make it 
redundant. [29J 
Most SAMs used after these attacks were launched in a 
largely ineffective unguided ballistic mode. This enabled 
most Coalition strike aircraft to bomb at altitudes above 
10,000' - out of range of most surviving Iraqi ground 
defences. [30J However, low-altitude RAF Tornado strikes 
against Iraqi airfields early in the war, and ground-attack 
missions throughout it, were at greater risk to Iraqi 
ground-fire. [31J 
By early February centralised Iraqi air defence control had 
been abandoned. [32J Many analysts have claimed that the 
rigidity inherent in the centralised control structure of 
Iraq's lADS made the 'graceful degradation' for which it was 
designed virtually impossible. [33J To some extent their 
conclusions are valid. 
The dependence of the lADS on just 29 focal strategic nodes 
made it potentially vulnerable to a limited number of 
successful strikes, although the number of sorties actually 
mounted against them, 436, was sizeable - which perhaps 
reflected initial uncertainties about the effectiveness of 
Coalition strikes. However, an effective defence against an 
air campaign of the scale mounted by the Coalition would 
have required a well-coordinated and responsive defensive 
system; it is difficult to see how this could have been 
achieved without centralised direction. 
It may be salutary to consider that the Coalition air 
campaign would have been severely disrupted had a vigorous 
effort been successful against its limited number of assets 
- the 13 AWACS, 2 J-STARS and 3 ABCCC aircraft - which 
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provided the electronic basis for effective aerial command 
and control. [34J The quick collapse of the Iraqi lADS shows 
that the vulnerability of complex strategic infrastructure 
to modern weapons provides an advantage to a side which 
strikes a successful surprise blow. 
On January 24 General Powell announced that the Coalition 
"had achieved air superiority throughout the entire 
theatre". This followed a decline in Iraqi sorties from 120 
on January 17 to 40 by January 24. [35J However, Powell's 
accompanying statement that there was "no point in wasting 
further effort now on destroying Iraqi aircraft" was 
premature. The effort to destroy Iraqi aircraft continued 
after January 24, but with a change in emphasis in the 
Coalition's airfield-denial tactics from attacks on Iraqi 
airfield runways to attacks on Iraqi HAS. 
While the collapse of centralised control probably 
eliminated the IAF's ability to seriously contest Coalition 
attacks, "it took a while" before the Coalition was 
confident of this. [36J Attacks on airfields were therefore 
continued to ensure the IAF's capacity was not revived. 66 
airfields were finally targeted by the Coalition; 1,300 
sorties were launched against these by January 31. 
However, only 9 airfields were confirmed as destroyed - 8 of 
them by RAF Tornado aircraft, armed with the JP-233 airfield 
denial munition, in dangerous very low-altitude missions. 
Each JP-233 dispensed 30 cratering bomblets and 215 delayed 
action mines to destroy airfield runways. [37J The Tornados 
sustained disproportionately high losses - 6 were lost 
before their runway strikes were suspended on January 25 -
although only 1 Tornado was claimed over an airfield. [38J 
The difficulty of the runway attacks was exacerbated by 
Iraqi deceptions including the painting of fake bomb damage 
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on undamaged air fields to confuse strike aircraft. The 
Tornado losses, although statistically small, encouraged the 
shift to HAS attacks, using stand-off PGMs, after January 
24. 
Iraq's reaction to the HAS attacks demonstrated that it had 
ceded air supremacy to the Coalition. The exit of Iraqi 
aircraft for Iran accelerated after the HAS attacks 
commenced. Between 7 to 24 Iraqi aircraft flew to Iran 
between January 20 and January 26 - increasing to 80 
aircraft by January 28 and finally to 122 aircraft. 
68 Coalition (including 56 US) aircraft were lost in combat 
in the war. A further 22 aircraft were lost in accidents. 
However, none were destroyed by Iraqi aircraft. 42 Iraqi 
aircraft were destroyed in air-to-air combat - all but two 
by US aircraft. In addition, between 68 and 141 Iraqi 
aircraft were destroyed in ground-attack missions - this 
range reflects variations in the estimates of the number of 
aircraft destroyed in HAS attacks. [39J Such one-sided 
exchange ratios have only been previously achieved by the 
Israeli Air Force for much briefer periods. 
Command and Control targets 
The increasing accuracy of nuclear weapons led in the 1980s 
to the emergence of ideas that an opponent's ability to 
maintain military command and control could be 'decapitated' 
by a limited number of strikes on primary command centres. 
[40J These ideas were extended into conventional warfare. 
Air strikes on the Iraqi C3I structure were intended to 
"sever the connections between the Iraqi high command .. and 
the Iraqi forces, and to curtail the flow of intelligence" 
to command authorities. [41J The Pentagon later stated that 
"if rendered unable to command and control their military 
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forces .. they might be compelled to comply with Coalition 
demands". [42J 
secretary Cheney stated on January 27 that "We clearly are 
interested in destroying" [the Iraqi] national command 
authority". While Cheney distinguished between attacks on 
Saddam as a "specific individual" and attacks on the 
national command authority as a collective entity, it is 
clear that a major effort was mounted to eliminate Saddam. 
[43J 
2 USAF F-lllFs used the new 4,700-lb GBU-28 ground 
penetration bomb on the last night of the war against a 
bunker where Saddam was believed to be located. [44J 
However, Saddam was not in this complex and was more 
fortunate than many of his subordinates; the Pentagon 
estimated that only a third of senior Iraqi commanders 
survived Coalition air attacks and Saddam's purges of 
'incompetent' commanders. [45J 
CENTCOM estimated that at the end of January 75 per cent of 
Iraq's C3 facilities had been struck, with one third 
rendered irreparable. This forced the Iraqis to use more 
vulnerable and less effective back-up systems - by mid-
February, it took 24 hours for a message from Baghdad to 
reach the front. [46J The destruction of Iraqi command and 
control may have even been too effective. Heikal claims 
that Baghdad ordered a withdrawal from Kuwait at the start 
of Desert Sword, but communications difficulties prevented 
this message from being received by some units until they 
were already engaged. [47J 
While many Iraqi communications links survived, Iraqi 
communications activity was clearly reduced - largely 
because field commanders were apprehensive their 
communications would be tracked by Coalition signals 
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intelligence and their units would be bombed. [48J Arkin's 
point that many Coalition strikes against C2 facilities were 
directed against denuded facilities may be valid; however, 
by forcing the removal of electronic equipment for the 
duration, the threat of these strikes achieved an important 
coercive strategic purpose. 
Scuds 
Iraqi Scud attacks commenced on January 18, when 8 missiles 
landed on Israeli cities. In all 40 missiles were launched 
against Israel and 46 against Saudi Arabia during the war. 
The limited effectiveness of these strikes is shown by the 
low casualties resulting from them. 4 persons were killed 
and 185 injured in Israel; 31 persons were killed and about 
400 injured in Saudi Arabia, including 28 US personnel 
killed in a strike on Dharhran on February 25. 37 Scuds 
were successfully intercepted by US Army Patriot point 
defence missiles. [49J 
Despite their limited effectiveness, the Scuds provoked a 
disproportionate response. They posed a particularly 
difficult dilemma for Israel, whose strategic policy for 
over 4 decades has been based on retaliation. However, in 
this crisis an Israeli retaliation could benefit Saddam - he 
sought to "trigger a response, not to avoid one". [50J At an 
Israeli Cabinet meeting called to discuss the first strikes, 
the Israeli Chief of Staff advised that "an Israeli response 
would cause severe damage to the international coalition", a 
view accepted by the Cabinet. [51J 
However, after 3 Scuds struck Tel Aviv on January 20, 
Israeli aircraft were scrambled both as a precaution against 
a follow-on Iraqi air attack and "to save time" if ordered 
to retaliate. [52J This attack was only averted after 
Secretary Cheney was contacted by the Israeli government. 
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Cheney undertook to supply the Israelis with real-time data 
on Scud launches and to dispatch Patriot batteries, with 
their US crews, to Israel. 
The Israelis had initially requested the release of IFF 
codes and the opening of an air corridor for four hours to 
Israeli aircraft. Cheney refused these requests. His 
refusal demonstrated that the mechanics of modern military 
command and control have wider political implications beyond 
control of the battlefield. However, a contingency plan had 
been drawn up, should the Israelis have proceeded with a 
retaliatory strike, for a corridor to be cleared of 
Coalition aircraft. [53] 
The 'Scud-hunt' involved a very intensive effort from 
Coalition aircraft which peaked at 150-200 sorties per day 
and reached 2,493 sorties in total. These strikes did not 
eliminate Scud launches but they significantly reduced them 
from an average of 5 per day up to January 27 to an average 
of 1 per day thereafter. [54] The mobile Scud launchers 
proved difficult targets. Their missiles were mainly fired 
at night and could be prepared and launched within an hour, 
although such rushed launches further reduced their limited 
accuracy. As in other aspects of the war, the Iraqis also 
proved adept in the use of decoys to confuse attacking 
aircraft. 
The Coalition used a combination of standing combat air 
patrols (mainly F-15s) over the main Scud launch areas, and 
attacks by A-lOs on the access roads to these areas, to 
suppress Scud launches. [55] These operations benefited from 
J-STARS and satellite data, although these assets could not 
easily distinguish between real and decoy launchers. The 
Coalition also relied heavily on Special Forces ground teams 
to locate and laser-designate Scud launchers for attacking 
aircraft. 
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The relative difficulty of the Scud hunt indicates the value 
of small, mobile units that are able to take advantage of 
surprise and night conditions even when faced with an 
opponent as militarily resource-rich as the Coalition. 
However, such tactical advantages were offset by the 
reduction in accuracy caused by the threat of air attacks. 
The fall in Scud launch rates shows that the missiles would 
have posed a greater threat without the suppressive air 
strikes. 
The Scud-hunt was an important strategic success, most 
critically in helping quell Israeli anxieties. without the 
fall in launch rates the air attacks produced the political 
pressure for an earlier and possibly more costly start to 
the ground-offensive may have been irresistible. As it was, 
the persistence of the Scud strikes provides a strong 
argument against the proposition that air power alone could 
have won the Gulf War. 
The Scud attacks "gave Saddam the right to claim that Iraq 
was taking the fight to the enemy, and attacking the hated 
Zionists on behalf of all Arabs". without a ground 
campaign, Saddam could have withdrawn his army from Kuwait, 
however battered it was, undefeated, and "the Scud campaign 
would have helped to create a myth of Iraqi victory". [56J 
NBC 
The Scud strikes, and other Iraqi operations, would have 
been more dangerous had they been combined with Iraqi 
chemical warfare capabilities. The use of chemical weapons 
against the Coalition now appears to have been precluded by 
Secretary Baker's warning on 9 January that the united 
States would hold the Iraqi leadership directly accountable 
for their use, although these weapons weighed in CENTCOM's 
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calculations of potential threats until the end of the war. 
[57J 
The Coalition found no evidence that chemical weapons were 
issued to Iraqi field commanders. [58J However, the USAF has 
claimed that an F-117A strike in late January destroyed 
Iraqi bombers that were preparing for a chemical weapons 
attack. [59J 
While the destruction of Iraqi NBC capabilities was not 
specifically authorised by the UN, "they were seen as the 
basis for Saddam's ability to intimidate the region in the 
future, so their elimination was a war aim in itself". [60J 
Iraqi nuclear capabilities were considered the most 
important unconventional weapons target; the air attacks on 
them may indicate an increasingly blurred demarcation 
between conventional and non-conventional warfare. [61J 
Significantly, the last F-117A strike in the war was against 
an Iraqi nuclear facility soon after its late detection. 
[62J 
General Schwarzkopf claimed at the end of January that all 
known Iraqi nuclear facilities were destroyed. However, the 
defected Iraqi scientists claimed that the Coalition had 
only targeted 3 of Iraq's 7 nuclear weapons development 
sites, and that significant assets survived even at these. 
[63J As noted, this, and the revelation that Iraq's nuclear 
weapons program was far more advanced than first considered, 
illustrates one of the Coalition's critical intelligence 
difficulties. 
1 1J.-;'~_------",-
11' 
II: 
75 
Phases 3 and 4 - Battlefield Preparation & Desert Sword 
The air attacks on the Iraqi Army in the KTO before the 
start of Desert Sword were designed to "isolate ground 
forces from resupply and reinforcements .. to compel these 
forces to consume supplies, and finally to apply pressure in 
such a way as to sap their morale" - or, as Powell put it, 
to cut the Iraqi Army off, "then kill it". [64J 
Mason has described the KTO as a salient where Iraqi 
defensive advantages could be overcome by aerial 
encirclement. [65J The Iraqi Army was dependent on extended 
lines of communication (LOCs), which were vulnerable to 
aerial interdiction, particularly if key choke-points - the 
bridges over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in the Basra 
region, the neck of the KTO salient - were destroyed. [66J 
Under Coalition air attack, its strategic over-extension 
terminally strained both the Iraqi Army's C3 and logistics 
systems. McKinley wrote that its logistical vulnerability 
became the Iraqi Army's "death sentence". [67J 
Communications delays forced Saddam to move near the front 
to take personal charge of the Khafji attack in late January 
- an illustration of how Coalition air attacks exploited the 
rigidity of the Iraqi command structure. [68J 
By the end of the war, over 35,000 sorties had been flown 
against the Iraqi Army, including 5,600 sorties against the 
Republican Guard. [69J This represented about 70 per cent of 
all the Coalition's combat/strike operations. While a 50 
per cent reduction in the combat capabilities of front-line 
forces was claimed by CENTCOM by the start of Desert Sword, 
the Republican Guard was less damaged. [70J 
As noted earlier, other demands substantially reduced the 
aircraft initially available for these attacks. strikes 
'fl 
i·, 
76 
against the Republican Guard, for instance, only became 
fully effective as late as February 15, when F-16s became 
available - the A-lOs previously used were more vulnerable 
to ground fire. [71J 
By January 30, General Schwarzkopf claimed that supplies to 
Iraqi troops had already been cut by 50 per cent, although 
this was disputed by others. [72J Schwarzkopf's announcement 
was made before the Coalition commenced its major 'bridge-
busting' effort on February 5/6. From February 10, RAF 
Buccaneer and Tornado aircraft were primarily tasked with 
bridge strikes. By February 15, 27 of Iraq's 36 bridges on 
its main transport routes had been destroyed; a further 8 
were destroyed by the end of the war. The difficulty of 
destroying these targets is illustrated by the RAF estimate 
that 24 strikes were required on average to destroy a 
bridge. [73J 
The effectiveness of strikes on logistic links was amplified 
by the Iraqi practice of not distributing large quantities 
of ammunition to individual units, to decrease the 
possibility of rebellion. This led to wasteful duplications 
in the re-supply chain and increased the vulnerability of 
transport trucks to air attack. [74J The J-STARS aircraft 
enabled CENTCOM to develop a detailed map of the Iraqi 
logistical network which forced a reduction in the size of 
re-supply convoys. [75J By the commencement of Desert 
Sword, "the Iraqi supply system had ceased to function in 
any meaningful fashion". [76J 
B-52 bombers conducted 1,624 sorties and dropped 25,700 tons 
of munitions - 29 per cent of the total air ordnance 
expended during the war. [77J The effectiveness of these 
raids appears to have correlated with the progress of the 
interdiction campaign against Iraqi LOCs - as food supplies 
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decreased the psychological effects of the B-52 strikes were 
progressively amplified. [78J 
While the B-52s success in breaking Iraqi morale has been 
widely acknowledged, their effectiveness was significantly 
enhanced by the concentration and particularly the 
immobility of Iraqi troops. The extent to which its stasis 
made the Iraqi Army uniquely vulnerable to B-52 strikes is a 
factor to bear heavily in mind when claims such as Arkin's 
that 'massive amounts of bombs are needed to win a war' are 
considered. 
As it was, the success of strikes by ground attack aircraft 
with PGMs may have had an equally deleterious effect on 
Iraqi morale as B-52 strikes. Iraqi soldiers, observing the 
destruction of individual vehicles with PGMs, may have 
"rapidly concluded that the safest course of action was to 
separate themselves from their tanks and armoured personnel 
carriers". [79J 
While B-52 missions benefited greatly from Iraqi immobility, 
lower altitude strikes with PGMs and other ordnance made any 
sizeable movement by Iraqi forces an extremely dangerous 
proposition. For instance, on 22 January 2 A-lOs and an AC-
130 were directed by a J-STARS aircraft to an Iraqi column 
of about 71 vehicles; the BAI aircraft destroyed 58 of these 
vehicles. This convoy may have been involved with 
preparations for the attack on the Saudi border town of 
Khafji on January 29. [80J 
BAI missions were also assisted by the environmental 
conditions of the KTO. For instance, the temperature 
differences between Iraqi armoured vehicles and their 
revetments meant that these vehicles were readily detectable 
early in the night or morning, by aircraft equipped with 
infra-red-seeking target acquisition systems. [81J 
~-. , 
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Saddam's brief departure from a defensive strategy with the 
Khafji attack almost certainly indicates his anxiety with 
the way the war was proceeding even at that relatively early 
stage. While an Iraqi brigade occupied Khafji for two days, 
the Iraqi Army's vulnerability, without air support, to air 
attack was highlighted in this battle. Between 2 and 3 Iraqi 
divisions, which should have constituted the main attack 
force, were caught by air-strikes on their start-lines and 
forced to retreat. [82] 
While the Iraqi Army was not able to generally compensate 
for the absence of aerial support, it demonstrated a high 
degree of defensive tactical skill in some areas. Iraqi 
soldiers proved adept at communications interception, and 
this provided timely warning of imminent Coalition ground-
attack aircraft strikes. [83] 
These interceptions also assisted an improvised combination 
of radar-guided SA-8 SAMs with infra-red SA-9 or 16 SAMs which 
"laid ambush" to low-flying ground-attack aircraft. Observation 
of Coalition tactics, involving a hard left or right turn to 
break the lock of the SA-8s, led to the Iraqis deploying 
their infra-red missiles at right-angles to the SA-8s. When 
Coalition pilots made their turns, they offered "a big heat 
plume" from engine exhausts to the infra-red missiles. [84] 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the timing of Desert Sword was 
the most critical issue facing CENTCOM, and its intelligence 
difficulties were the most critical issue in determining 
this timing. Bomb damage assessment was "as much an art as 
a science". [85] 
CENTCOM compiled its estimates of bomb damage by including 
about 50 per cent of the apparent kills shown in aircraft 
videos, one third of the claims of A-IO pilots (which were 
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judged more reliable because the A-lOs could linger over the 
battlefield) and all the damage able to be confirmed by high 
resolution imagery. These estimates were disputed by the 
USAF as too conservative and by the CIA, which only accepted 
satellite imagery, as too optimistic. [86J 
By the start of Desert Sword, CENTCOM estimated that the 
Iraqi Army had lost 38 per cent of the tanks, 32 per cent of 
the armoured personnel carriers, and 45 per cent of the 
artillery with which it began the war. CENTCOM further 
estimated that losses were higher among front-line units. 
The CIA estimated at that point that only 10 to 15 per cent 
of Iraqi assets had been destroyed. [87J 
The precise extent to which the air campaign had degraded 
the Iraqi Army's capabilities remains uncertain. However, 
CENTCOM's estimates were deliberately conservative, to avoid 
a repeat of the exaggerated claims of Communist losses that 
were made in the vietnam War. 
As noted, by mid-February prisoner of war interrogations 
were providing additional evidence to CENTCOM of severe 
hardships among front-line units, including the failure of 
resupply and summary executions of deserting soldiers by the 
Republican Guard. CENTCOM may also have received 
intelligence on the state of the Iraqi Army from Special 
Forces teams inserted close to Iraqi units. [88J 
CENTCOM was concerned that its ground forces would be 
vulnerable to chemical and artillery attacks in their 
initial penetrations of the Saddam Line. Accordingly, as G-
day for Desert Sword, February 24, approached, CENTCOM 
allocated more sorties for battlefield-preparation and 
breaching operations. [89J CENTCOM required the elimination 
of 90 per cent of the Iraqi artillery covering breach-
points. Special weapons, including heavy kinetic energy 
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bombs and Fuel-Air Explosives, were used to collapse Iraqi 
dug-outs and detonate minefields. [90] 
The Coalition's CAS effort during Desert Sword was very 
intensive - more than 1,400 CAS sorties were flown on both 
February 25 and 26 alone. However, the rapid disintegration 
of Iraqi resistance during Desert Sword meant that the 
Coalition's aerial means were perceived to be fast out-
pacing the remaining worthwhile military ends. 
This perception contributed very significantly to the timing 
of the cease-fire. On February 25 USAF Brigadier General 
Glosson, CENTCOM's chief air operations planner, was alerted 
by an intelligence source in Kuwait City that the Iraqis 
were "packing up". An Iraqi column of around 1,000 vehicles 
was detected by J-STARS aircraft two hours later retreating 
towards Basra. [91] 
Glosson ordered an F-15E strike which blocked the convoy at 
both ends on February 26. The Mutla Pass choke-point 
prevented Iraqi vehicles from dispersing. The convoy was 
repeatedly attacked by US aircraft, and the US Army's Tiger 
Brigade, later that day. [92] USN and USMC aircraft 
participating in these attacks were "restricted only by the 
rate at which the carrier lifts could bring ordnance to the 
flight deck". [93] 
The Bush Administration became quickly concerned with the 
effects of these attacks on public opinion. On February 27 
General Powell advised President Bush that the Coalition's 
military objectives had been accomplished, and the President 
approved a cease-fire scheduled for 8am on February 28. [94] 
The timing of the cease-fire was later heavily criticised. 
US forces were halted just short of 2 roads north of Basra. 
The closure of these roads would have prevented the retreat 
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of 2 Republican Guard divisions with their heavy equipment. 
These units subsequently suppressed the Shi'ite revolt in 
the Basra region in March-April 1991, and thus ensured 
Saddam's survival. [95J Moreover, General McPeak observed 
that the Mutla Pass incident was quite legitimate in 
military terms, for the best time to attack an enemy is when 
it is in a disorganised retreat. [96J 
The air campaign was designed to rapidly destroy the Iraqi 
armed forces, and to minimise Coalition casualties. It 
achieved these objectives, but the war was ended partly in 
recognition of the political costs which might arise from a 
too vivid display of modern air power's destructive 
capabilities. 
*** 
An indication of the scale of the air campaign, and the 
magnitude of Iraq's defeat, is provided by a number of 
statistics. 
Coalition aircraft expended approximately 88,500 tons of 
ordnance during the Gulf War. This represented an average 
'monthly' bomb tonnage of 40,416 tons. By comparison united 
states aircraft expended a monthly average of 44,014 tons in 
the vietnam War, and Allied aircraft a monthly average of 
47,777 tons in World War II. [97J 
The monthly average for the Gulf War is of a comparable 
magnitude to that of the earlier conflicts. However the 
intensity of the Coalition air effort is emphasised when 
other factors are considered. These include technological 
advances that permitted smaller ratios of bomb tonnage to 
targets destroyed; the fact that the Gulf War only lasted 6 
weeks, so that an intense air effort had to be maintained 
from the outset in order to produce a monthly average 
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comparable to that of the earlier conflicts; and the 
maintenance of this average despite the cancellation of many 
missions because of bad weather and, later, smoke from oil 
well fires ignited by the Iraqis. 
united states' aircraft flew approximately 73 per cent of 
the total 109,867 Coalition sorties. Approximately 50 per 
cent of Coalition sorties were flown by the USAF; 16 per 
cent by the USN and 7 per cent by the USMC. [98] 
Coalition casualties included 148 US troops, and 191 troops 
from other nations, killed in action. The great disparity 
between the military means of the two sides is shown by the 
fact that approximately 25 per cent of US casualties, and 50 
per cent of UK casualties, were from 'friendly fire'. 
Freedman and Karsh have derived a best estimate of 35,000 
Iraqi soldiers killed in both the air and ground phases of 
the war. An official Iraqi source estimated that 2,278 
Iraqi civilians were killed in the war. According to US 
Defense Intelligence Agency and Greenpeace data, a further 
100,000-120,000 civilian deaths can be attributed to war-
related ailments (including the collapse of Iraqi public 
health services after the war), and the Iraqi civil unrest 
in March-April 1991. [99] 
In January 1992, Iraq was estimated to have retained 703 
tanks, 1,430 armoured personnel carriers and 340 artillery 
pieces - representing respectively 15 per cent, 50 per cent 
and 10 per cent of the pre-war Iraqi inventory of these 
weapons. [100J 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS 
The Coalition's air campaign dominated military operations 
in all but the last 4 days of the Gulf War and achieved 
strategic results far more quickly, and much more cheaply, 
than in previous air campaigns of a comparable magnitude. 
Although its political vulnerabilities were a major concern, 
it was highly unlikely that the Coalition would be defeated. 
Nevertheless, a quick and cheap Coalition victory was by no 
means certain. 
The Coalition's advantages in air power were therefore 
critical in enabling it to dictate the course of operations 
and minimise its own casualties. In addition, air power 
contributed fundamentally to defeating Saddam's attempt to 
regain the initiative in the Khafji attack and in the 
suppression of Scud missile strikes, the most dangerous 
Iraqi initiative in the war. 
These successes have been qualified with the observation 
that the Gulf War did not impose an extreme test on most of 
the Coalition's military capabilities. In particular, the 
failure of the IAF to seriously challenge the Coalition 
enabled CENTCOM to proceed through its campaign plan largely 
at a pace of its own choosing. The effort to suppress Iraqi 
Scud strikes represented the one critical exception to this 
and demonstrated both the advantages and limitations of air 
power in the Gulf War. 
The 'Scud hunt' demonstrated CENTCOM's flexible use of air 
power in a way that largely overcame the inherent rigidity 
of its own mission tasking system. However, the Scud 
strikes were not eliminated until the Coalition had defeated 
Iraq on the ground. 
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The events of the Gulf War do not support the claim that the 
strategic aspects of the air campaign were an unnecessary 
effort. However, where critics such as Arkin are on firmer 
ground is in regard to the strategic justification for the 
scale of attacks on some target sets, such as electrical 
power facilities. Conversely, other target sets, such as 
nuclear research facilities, were not targeted as 
comprehensively as CENTCOM's objectives required. Both 
these cases also reflect more general intelligence 
shortfalls which led to duplicative strikes, or no strikes 
at all, against particular targets. 
Most of the 'new' technology employed in the Gulf War 
performed well. That the accuracy of specific munitions has 
been re-evaluated from the 90 per cent success rates 
initially claimed down to a level of 60 per cent or so is 
not surprising. The lower rates are after all more 
consistent with peacetime range scores. However, while the 
demonstrated potential of PGMs to destroy a target with a 
single 'shot' was well advertised by CENTCOM, a more 
significant feature of the air campaign was the sustainment 
of a level of strikes which ensured particular targets were 
destroyed with these munitions. 
Many Iraqi targets sets, including the lADS and bridge 
targets discussed in Chapter 3, required a significant 
effort to destroy them, even with accurate PGMs. The 
Coalition's ability to sustain this effort through a very 
high sortie rate was therefore one of the most critical 
aspects of its operations; in this respect the major 
achievements of the air campaign rested on the Coalition's 
logistical capabilities. These, as with many other 
capabilities, were several orders of magnitude above those 
of Iraq. 
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Iraq was not a technologically backward opponent, but the 
Coalition had access to technological assets which either in 
degree or kind were not available to Iraq. The F-117A 
stealth aircraft, in particular, received great acclaim 
although its performance has, as noted, been qualified by 
critics who have emphasised the support provided to their 
early missions by EW aircraft. However, the F-117A's 
stealth characteristics amplified this support. 
stealth aircraft are a continuation of the contest between 
electronic detection and intrusion which began before the 
Second World War. While there is evidence of the emergence 
of effective countervailing detection technologies, the F-
117As showed that an aircraft whose stealthiness is totally 
disproportionate to a defender's detection capabilities can 
prove very effective indeed, and it is highly probable that 
stealth technology will form a major element of future 
developments in air power. 
The air war in the Gulf did not demonstrate the strategic 
primacy of air power over other forms of military force. It 
did, however, demonstrate that, when linked to achievable 
objectives, air campaigns can contribute decisively to the 
outcome of conflicts, and that the effectiveness of this 
contribution is a product of factors equally applicable to 
other forms of military force, especially good command and 
control and intelligence. These demonstrations may 
ultimately prove more useful than assertions that air power 
'won' the Gulf War. 
As discussed at the outset of this thesis, any attempt to 
distil the implications of the Gulf War for future conflicts 
is very difficult. The air campaign will influence future 
developments, but the specific relevance of this influence 
is uncertain. The air war in the Gulf demonstrated the 
fundamental importance of air power in a conventional war. 
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However, in underlining both the vulnerability of a large 
military establishment to air attack, and the cost of 
deploying a force sufficient to exploit this vulnerability, 
the Gulf War may foreshadow the decreasing utility of large 
military operations. 
In this respect the Scud-offensive, involving smaller and 
more elusive Iraqi units, and the Coalition response to it, 
may foreshadow aspects of both the nature and difficulties 
of future conflicts. 
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